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PREFACE 
"The history of the world," according to Scottish 
historian Thomas Carlyle, "is but the biography of great 
men." Such an assertion has undergone great challenges in 
the later half of the twentieth century, particularly from 
French annalists like Fernand Braudel, as more and more 
historians have concentrated their efforts on history "from 
the bottom up," uncovering the stories of those who were 
overlooked by scholars of Carlyle's time--laborers, 
immigrants and ethnic minority groups, and women. 
v 
There is still room in the historical profession, I 
believe, for examining the lives and careers of those "great 
dead white men" who influenced the lives of everyday people. 
In Indiana, particularly in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, no man had a greater impact on the 
political life of Hoosiers, particularly the issue of 
suffrage, than Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr. As an amateur historian 
who became immersed in the cauldron of political activity 
that marked Indiana's history as a pivotal state in national 
politics, Dunn left behind riveting firsthand accounts of 
those heady days. The full story of Dunn's influence on the 
political activities he described in such mulitvolume works 
as Indiana and Indianans and Greater Indianapolis, both of 
which remain standard works today, has rarely been 
scrutinized, a situation I hope is rectified through the 
following work. 
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Many people have had a hand in helping to prepare this 
thesis. For their comments on a earlier version of this 
work, which was eventually published in the December 1994 
issue of the Indiana Magazine of History as "'To Secure 
Honest Elections': Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr., and the Reform of 
Indiana's Ballot," I am indebted to Dr. Robert Barrows, 
Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis 
associate professor of history; Dr. James H. Madison, 
Indiana University History Department chairman; and Lorna 
Lutes Sylvester, Indiana Magazine of History associate 
editor. Members of my thesis committee, Dr. Ralph Gray and 
Dr. Scott Seregny, also provided thoughtful and helpful 
suggestions for improvements. 
Also providing invaluable assistance and advice on this 
and the earlier work have been my wife, Megan McKee, Indiana 
Historical Society editor; J. Kent Calder, Traces of Indiana 
and Midwestern History managing editor; and Paula Corpuz, 
IHS senior editor. 
I would also like to thank the staffs at the IHS's 
William Henry Smith Memorial Library, the Indiana State 
Archives, and the Indiana State Library's Indiana Division 
for their assistance in securing the needed documents and 
materials for researching this paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Frederick M. Davenport, a staff correspondent for the 
weekly New York City newspaper The outlook, traveled 
extensively throughout the Middle West in the spring of 1916 
gathering information on the upcoming presidential 
nomination campaign. One of the places he visited was 
Indiana, which had often played a pivotal role in national 
elections up to that time. Reflecting on the Hoosier state, 
Davenport wrote that back East, Indiana had the "reputation 
politically of being sodden, mediocre, deeply satisfied with 
things as they are provided they are bad enough." He 
characterized the state's party managers as "flat, insipid, 
and platitudinous." The reporter went on to portray Indiana 
as the "original lair of the stand-patter in the United 
States." 1 
Davenport's assessment of the nineteenth state had more 
than a little basis in fact. During the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, Indiana, as Democratic United 
states Senator Daniel W. Voorhees termed it, was the 
"Belgium of politics, the debatable land between great 
contending parties and opinions." 2 Democrats and Republicans 
battled fiercely to sway Indiana voters to their cause by 
such means as naming Hoosiers to their national tickets, 
usually as vice president. From 1840 to 1940 almost 60 
2 
percent of the national elections had Indiana politicians on 
the ballot. One Republican official in 1876 went as far as 
to claim that "a bloody shirt campaign, with money, and 
Indiana is safe; a financial campaign and no money and we 
are beaten." .As an "October state" from 1851 through 1880, 
with elections for state and local officials held a month 
before the regular election, Indiana offered to political 
parties a sounding board on the mood of the voters. The 
state's prominence in national politics, however, came with 
a price. Party managers used whatever means necessary to 
garner votes for their candidates, including importing 
voters from out-of-state and outright vote buying. Such 
activities won for Indiana, noted a historian of the period, 
an "unenviable reputation for political corruption." 3 
Corruption had become so commonplace in the Hoosier 
state that those working at the grassroots level for their 
party of choice offered as proof of their loyalty the fact 
that they had "risked the penitentiary" on its behalf. 
Fellowships formed across party lines as workers on either 
side held little or no fear of harsh penalties being enacted 
if they were caught dealing in some shady political 
maneuvering. "Usually after a warm campaign," a historian of 
the period noted, "there were several arrests, and sometimes 
indictments, but there was always an 'exchange of 
prisoners. 1114 
Disgusted with the political situtation in his state, 
Republican attorney William P. Fishback, in a plea for 
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honest elections before Indiana University students in 1886, 
offered the following assessment: 
If Nathaniel Hawthorne's magic bugle were to summon into 
line--clothed in proper raiment of horizontal stripes, all 
the rascals who bribed voters, or who took bribes for their 
votes, who corrupted election officers, or falsified 
election returns, who swore in illegal votes, who colonized 
voters, who voted twice, or voted double tickets, who 
tampered with ballots after they were cast, who consorted 
with or encouraged repeaters and ballot-box stuffers, or who 
were accessory to their escape from the just penalties of 
the violated law, it would be, I fear, a large procession, 
in which we would see both parties represented, and in which 
we might discover men of good repute, as the phrase goes, 
and some who have had and now have official preferment 5 
mainly because they had earned a place in that procession. 
Deploring the sorry situation of Hoosier politics--he 
claimed that the state had been reduced to a "pitiable 
condition of political corruption . . . and both the great 
parties had been exhausting the resources of political 
depravity to carry it" 6--one man, Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr., an 
attorney, journalist, Indiana historian, and Democratic 
party regular, was in the vanguard of a reform endeavor 
stretching from 1888 to 1911 and dedicated to cleansing the 
sordid reputation Indiana had earned for itself through 
election chicanery. From his key role in adopting the 
Australian ballot system in Indiana to his ultimately failed 
attempt at enacting a new state constitution, Dunn, working 
both behind the scenes and in public, did more than anyone, 
including elected officials, to reduce fraud and ensure 
honest elections in Indiana. 
Through his work on electoral and other reforms--
shepherding through a new city charter for Indianapolis, 
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establishing township libraries throughout the state, and 
ensuring equitable tax assessments--and his historical 
writing, Dunn hoped both to reverse Indiana's poor national 
reputation and inspire Hoosiers to take a genuine sense of 
pride in their state. Although Dunn mainly blamed Indiana's 
political corruption for its sordid national standing, the 
historian pointed out that part of the blame also rested on 
"ignorance on the part of ourselves and of the world at 
large of what Indiana has to be proud of. We put in our time 
reading Eastern periodicals, studying European politics, and 
striving in general to keep up with what we call the 
progress of the century, instead of noting the real progress 
that is being made on all sides of us." 7 
Dunn's reform efforts came during an era when 
politicians, journalists, writers, lawyers, labor leaders, 
and others on the local, state, and national levels were 
attempting to rectify what they believed were iniquities in 
American life. This diverse group by no means agreed upon 
what reforms were needed. Some wanted to prohibit the 
consumption of alcohol, others hoped to lessen the powerful 
hold business trusts had on the country, and still others 
fought for women's suffrage. Drawing together these 
disparate aims was a shared sense of what one scholar of the 
period termed "optimism, morality, and activism." 8 They also 
shared such values as a faith in majority government; the 
firm belief that people should control their government, 
both before and after elections; and a conviction that 
citizens had an obligation to participate in forming their 
government. 9 
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For Dunn, however, the greatest obstacle standing in 
the way of good government was the corruption of voters. "Of 
what possible benefit is it to have direct primaries, if the 
candidate can purchase his nomination?" he asked. "Of what 
avail the initiative, referendum, or recall if your appeal 
is to a debauched electorate? What adds whether women vote 
or not, if enough voters are controlled to fix the results 
of the election?" In reality, Dunn proclaimed, without 
honest elections it would be "impossible" to have popular 
government. His fondest wish would be the power to ''sound in 
the ear of every voter in the country the solemn warning 
that if we do not eradicate the corruption of the suffrage 
in this country it will ruin our government. 1110 
Paradoxically, for one who often railed against the 
depravity of party regulars, Dunn preferred to engage in his 
reform activities from within the Democratic party, merging 
his political and historical interests throughout his 
career. His daughter, Caroline Dunn, who followed in her 
father's footsteps by seeking a career in a number of 
Indiana libraries, noted that her father was fascinated with 
politics. Much of his writing, she said, was "political or 
politico-economical. 1111 In an article titled "Duty of the 
State to Its History," which appeared in the December 1910 
issue of the Indiana Magazine of History, Jacob Dunn set out 
his philosophy about the merging of history and politics. He 
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agreed with the Roman historian Tacitus that the "chief use 
of history is to promote good government." Dunn noted that 
the democracy of his own day was a far cry from the absolute 
monarch of Tacitus's time. He theorized: 
History in our times is the record of progress in 
civilization and government. It is the record of the 
experience of the state, and a state should profit by its 
experiences just as an individual does. But there is this 
difference: An individual carries the memory of his 
experience with him, while the governing powers of a state 
are frequently changed, and the experience of one generation 
is lost to following ones, unless it be recorded in some 
permanent way. 
Dunn warned government officials that their actions in 
office--both good and bad--would be recorded for posterity. 
He also stressed the importance for future generations to 
know about the past "in order to hand down the goodly 
heritage of civilization and government that comes to their 
hands. 1112 Also, as an historian, Dunn believed that he had 
an obligation to keep watch over "history in the making, and 
point out evils to be avoided." Throughout his career he 
made a habit of pointing out those "evils to be avoided," 
and offered suggestions for ways to lessen their effect on 
the body politic. 13 
During his opening speech in his 1902 campaign for 
Congress in Indiana's Seventh Congressional District, Dunn 
expanded on his political beliefs for Hoosier voters. He 
declared that he believed fully in what he called the 
"American theory of government," with nations having the 
right to decide their own fate without interference from 
outside governments. This had to be true, he said, because 
"any people must know their own needs better than any other 
people know them and they are more interested in getting 
good government for themselves than any other people can do 
in giving them good government." Although people are often 
guided more by prejudice, desire for gain, or "unfounded 
hopes and fears" than by reason, Dunn expressed the belief 
that the "great majority of the people really want what is 
right. 1114 
The Hoosier historian stood by his convictions in 
practice as well as in theory by becoming actively involved 
in the reform issues cited above. Dunn knew that the 
successful passage of reform measures would not necessarily 
turn sinners into saints, but he believed such legislation 
could "prevent them from reaping the fruits of dishonesty." 
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He reasoned that the best way to stop suspected evil was "to 
take away, as far as possible, the motive for wrong-doing." 
Once men understood that they could violate the law at will, 
Dunn warned that "you will have as many varieties of 
violation as you have men to deal with." The public, he 
said, first had to be convinced of the nature of the evil to 
be remedied. Once that had been accomplished, officials 
could then convince voters to utilize a "rational remedy." 
Dunn used a folksy example to illustrate his idea, noting 
that a doctor may know how to treat rheumatism but he could 
not make any progress if a patient "thinks he can cure it by 
carrying a buckeye in his pocket. 1115 
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Dunn's reforming zeal seemed to be in line with the 
Progressive era's faith in having the right laws, enforced 
by the right men, producing the right results, but there was 
a difference. 16 He mixed his crusades for transformations of 
the Hoosier state with a healthy dose of Democratic party 
politics. Dunn reveled in the give-and-take of frontline 
politics and used his considerable writing skills on behalf 
of the Democrats. Although some of his Democratic friends 
considered him a mugwump--independent in his political 
beliefs--Dunn pointed out that all of his Republican 
associates "consider me a hide-bound Democrat: and I freely 
confess that I have a Democratic bias." He had this bias 
because he believed in "Democratic principles, and I know 
that they can be attained only through having Democrats in 
office. " 17 
Although he fought for political reform throughout his 
life, Dunn could never be mistaken for those reformers 
dismissed by Tammany Hall leader George Washington Plunkitt 
as "mornin' glories--looked lovely in the mornin' and 
withered up in a short time." 18 A practical man, Dunn had 
little time during campaigns for Prohibitionists, 
Socialists, and Social Labor parties who were too busy 
engaging in a "noble fight for the vindication of their 
principles" to actually elect their candidates. The object 
of an election, he pointed out, is to "choose officers to 
conduct the government, and they never will catch it; so 
there is no occasion for wasting any time considering 
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them." 19 Dunn remained loyal to the party of Jefferson and 
Jackson even if it meant being forced out of his position as 
Indianapolis city controller by a Democratic mayor looking 
for a scapegoat to bear the blame for financial 
irregularities practiced by his political appointees. 
Dunn's unwavering campaign for good government and 
honest elections, however, had another side. Like many of 
his Progressive-era contemporaries he distrusted the impact 
immigrants and African Americans might have on elections and 
devised measures to "restrict the franchise to the well-
bred, 'deserving' citizens of the community." 20 The 
legislation Dunn authored to secure a virtuous suffrage 
restricted voting rights to those who could read and write. 
He asserted that suffrage had "debased the negro, on the 
average, instead of elevating him. It has made him insolent 
and quarrelsome instead of self-respecting." Because he 
believed that the right to vote was based on the state's 
welfare, it would be unkind to give an African American "a 
right that is injuring him and injuring the state also." It 
would not be unjust, he continued, in denying voting rights 
"to the negro who remains illiterate, shiftless or 
criminal." 21 
Whatever his prejudices, Dunn deserves the lion's share 
of credit for restoring honesty to Hoosier elections. His 
determined struggle throughout his life to ensure the purity 
of the ballot typified the historian's perspective on life. 
This was an outlook that could not be confined to merely 
10 
recording the facts for posterity; Dunn was happiest as an 
active participant in the political process. He used his 
experiences in his various reform efforts--fighting for the 
Australian ballot law, securing a new city charter for 
Indianapolis, and a new constitution for the state--to 
produce riveting firsthand accounts on Indiana's history in 
such multivolume works as Greater Indianapolis (the standard 
history of Indianapolis for more than eighty years) and 
Indiana and Indianans. His fusion of history and politics 
continues to affect Hoosiers every time they go into a 
voting booth, close the curtain, pull a lever, and make 
their choices for representation in secrecy. 
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CHAPTER I 
JACOB PIATT DUNN, JR: EARLY LIFE AND INFLUENCES 
In the early summer of 1924 a reporter for the 
Indianapolis News, preparing an obituary on the life and 
career of Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr., a leading citizen who had 
just died, asked for a comment from United States Senator 
Samuel Ralston. The one-time Indiana governor had nothing 
but praise for the man who worked as his private secretary 
in Washington, D.C. Expressing his admiration for his 
deceased friend, Ralston noted that when the two had 
returned to Indianapolis from the nation's capital he could 
tell that something was wrong and that death was near. 
Characteristically, Ralston's friend and fellow Democrat was 
convinced he would be all right. "His will power was 
strong," Ralston said of Dunn, "and he was slow to admit 
that he could not accomplish anything he undertook. The idea 
of his having to surrender to the will of any man or even to 
physical troubles was to him apparently a preposterous 
1 thought." 
This stubbornness even in the face of the illness that 
would kill him stood Dunn in good stead as he battled to 
reform Indiana's wayward electoral system during the 
Progressive era. It was a stubbornness he came by honestly 
from his father, a prospector, farmer, and merchant, and one 
Dunn passed on to his daughter, Caroline, who for thirty-
nine years served as librarian for the Indiana Historical 
Society. 
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The political mastermind behind measures to purify the 
state's ballot was born on 12 April 1855 in Lawrenceburg, 
Indiana, the third of five children (four others had died in 
childhood) raised by Jacob and Harriet Louisa (Tate) Dunn. 
Dunn's father, Jacob Piatt Dunn, Sr., was the son of Isaac 
Dunn, one of the first settlers in the Whitewater Valley. A 
judge, bank president, businessman and postmaster in 
Lawrenceburg, Isaac Dunn often, after traveling to New 
Orleans on business matters, made the trip back home on 
foot. Jacob Piatt Dunn, Sr., a cattle trader for a time up 
and down the Ohio River and a lifelong Democrat, was one of 
many who traveled to California in 1849 seeking his fortune 
in the gold fields. He returned to Indiana in 1860 and a 
year later moved his family to Indianapolis, where he worked 
in the real estate business until his death on 21 November 
1890. 
A pious man, Dunn, Sr., upon his death, was lauded by 
the Meridian Street Methodist Episcopal Church of 
Indianapolis, where he had long been a member. "Brother Dunn 
was in every relation of life a character to be imitated and 
admired," read a memorial tribute adopted by the church. 
"His religious convictions being the result of candid 
thought and based upon a rational and intelligent faith, his 
religious life was symmetrical in all its parts. 112 The 
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onetime prospector, who retained investments in some 
Colorado silver mines, made it a point to instill the same 
high degree of religious faith in his children, especially 
when it came to such matters as the mora.li ty of alcohol. On 
2 April 1872 the then seventeen-year-old Jacob Piatt Dunn, 
Jr. and his siblings signed an agreement among themselves to 
abstain from drinking or using "as a beverage any 
intoxicating liquors either distilled or fermented and for 
the faithful maintenance of this obligation relying for aid 
on Divine Providence we pledge to each other our word and 
honor." 3 
After attending private schools for several years, Dunn 
entered the public schools in Indianapolis in 1867. Four 
years later, he was sent by his parents for further 
education to Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana, where he 
graduated in 1874 with a bachelor's degree in science. Life 
at the Quaker institution of higher learning was filled with 
the same moral fervor the young man had experienced in the 
Dunn household in Indianapolis. Reminiscing about his days 
at Earlham during a meeting of the Society of Indiana 
Pioneers, Dunn noted that during his time there the college 
refused to allow any musical instruments on campus. "In 
three years I heard but one song in a religious service," he 
recalled. One Sunday during the church service a young woman 
sang one verse of "Rock of Ages" all by herself. "It caused 
more discussion than any other event while I was there." 4 
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Those early religious experiences left their mark on 
Dunn. "There is nothing that affects a human life so much as 
a fervent, deep-seated belief, whether it concern religion 
or politics, or anything else," he said. 5 The future Indiana 
historian's religious upbringing fits a pattern shared by 
many Progressive-era men and women. In his study of one 
hundred of the first generation of American progressives 
born between 1854 and 1874, Robert M. Crunden found that 
they "absorbed the severe, Protestant moral values of their 
parents," but instead of entering the ministry, these 
educated men and women turned to new professions like 
academia, journalism, law, politics, and social work. "In 
each of these careers," Crunden noted, "they could become 
preachers urging moral reform on institutions as well as 
individuals." 6 
In 1876 Dunn received a law degree from the University 
of Michigan. After returning to his Indianapolis home, he 
continued his law studies with the firm of McDonald and 
Butler. The rigors of law, however, were no match for the 
lure of the West. In 1879 Dunn and his brothers left the 
Hoosier state for Colorado to look after their father's 
silver mine investments and to try their hand at 
prospecting. "There are a great many strangers here, 
•tender-feet' like myself," Dunn wrote a friend back in 
Indianapolis from Silver Cliff, Colorado, "who have come to 
seek their fortune. If half of us find it, we will carry off 
the State bodily." 7 
18 
He discovered, however, that the life of a prospector 
in Colorado's mountains was hard and thankless. The junior 
Dunn failed to strike it rich, but he did mine a collection 
of humorous stories about his adventures. on one prospecting 
trip into the mountains Dunn had camped near a stream and 
had gone to sleep only to awake at 10 p.m. that night nearly 
frozen. "Moved up nearer fire. Woke up 11 P.M., fire out; 
frozen to death; ditto at 12, 1, 2, 2:30, 3, 3:30, 4, 4:30, 
5." In the morning he found that his burro had wandered from 
camp and he spent a considerable time navigating the 
mountain's treacherous slopes to track it down. "The man who 
wrote 'Not for gold nor precious stones would I sell my 
mountain home,'" Dunn said, "was either a greenbacker or 
some other idiot who had never seen a mountain. I shall not 
go out of my way to climb mountains any more. If one 
approaches me I will defend myself, but I seek no trouble 
with them." 8 
Instead of treasure, Dunn found something far more 
important, trades that sustained him for the rest of his 
life: journalism and history. 9 While in Colorado Dunn loved 
to hear tales from old-time prospectors, whom he called 
"glorious liars"; he also became fascinated with Native 
American lore and history. Inspired by the appearance in 
1881 of Helen Hunt Jackson's A Century of Dishonor, an 
indictment of whites for their unjust treatment of Native 
Americans, he began to collect information on the clashes 
between white and Indian cultures, which motivated him to 
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write what became the book Massacres of the Mountains: A 
History of the Indian Wars of the Far West, 1815-1875, 
published in 1886. The book received a glowing review from 
another amateur historian, Theodore Roosevelt. Two years 
after the book had been published, Roosevelt wrote Dunn that 
in conducting some studies he had occasion to re-read 
Massacres of the Mountains. "I have been struck," said the 
future president, "with its absolute fairness and incisive 
truthfulness that I can not forebear writing to express my 
appreciation." Roosevelt went on to opine that Dunn's work 
would serve "as one of our standards. 1110 
Along with starting him on the path to his career as a 
historian, his time in Colorado also gave Dunn a chance to 
exercise what a fellow Indiana historian described as "a 
versatile mind and a facile pen" through his work on a 
number of newspapers in the state. 11 Dunn contributed 
articles to such newspapers as the Denver Republican, Denver 
Tribune, Leadville Chronicle, Maysville Democrat, and Rocky 
Mountain News. While covering city government for the Denver 
Republican, Dunn came face-to-face with a problem he made it 
his life's work to solve--political corruption. 
According to Dunn's account, on the Denver city council 
there were eight members who essentially ran the community. 
"Anybody who wanted anything from the city had to buy those 
eight members," he recalled. In one instance involving the 
c. B. & o. Railroad, which was attempting to build a line 
into the city, an ordinance the railroad wanted passed 
surprisingly faced opposition from all but one of the "Big 
Eight'' council members. Running across the railroad's 
attorney, Dunn reported the following conversation: 
"Your ordinance seems to have hard sledding." 
"Yes," he responded grimly. 
"I understand there hasn't been a square divvy," I 
suggested. 
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He smiled sweetly and turned away. At the next Council 
meeting the ordinance passed without opposition, and the 
story was in everybody's possession. The spokesman of the 
'Big Eight' had been approached and after negotiations had 
agreed to get the ordinance through for $5,000. The money 
had been paid to him, and he had coolly appropriated all of 
it. The railroad company could not complain that its bribery 
had not been carried out as agreed. All it
1
fould do was to 
buy the other seven members independently. 
During Dunn's early days in the field, history was, as 
Richard Hofstadter noted, "the prerogative either of 
leisure-class gentlemen of commanding means or of a few 
hardy spirits . . . who had the energy for other enterprises 
as well as history." 13 In pursuing a dual interest in 
history and journalism, Dunn followed a path first blazed in 
the Hoosier state by the "Father of Indiana History," John 
B. Dillon, who wrote the respected History of Indiana 
(1843), worked as editor of the Logansport Canal Telegraph, 
and served as state librarian. 14 It was a trail also 
followed by Dunn's contemporaries, George S. Cottman, 
founder of the Indiana Magazine of History and author of 
frequent historical articles for Indianapolis newspapers; 
Claude Bowers, Indianapolis journalist, orator, and 
diplomat; and Albert Beveridge, Republican United States 
senator. Nationally, Dunn's role as an amateur historian 
involved in politics paralleled, but failed to match, the 
careers of men like Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. 15 
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Dunn returned to Indianapolis in 1884, wiser in the 
ways of politics but faced with the problem of making a 
living. Although he resumed the practice of law, he found 
time to visit the Indiana State Library and its collection 
of government documents for the necessary material to 
complete Massacres of the Mountains. "He was among the first 
historians of this subject," noted one scholar of Dunn's 
life, "to base his narrative on government documents, which 
he used extensively." 16 Impressed by the young historian's 
work, the publishing firm Houghton Mifflin asked him to 
write the Indiana volume for its American Commonwealth 
series, which resulted in the book Indiana: A Redemption 
from Slavery (1888). Through the years other historical 
publications flowed from Dunn's pen, including Documents 
Relating to the French Settlements on the Wabash (1894), the 
two-volume Greater Indianapolis (1910), and his five-volume 
state history Indiana and Indianans (1919). 
Dunn was meticulous in conducting his research, 
adopting a hands-on approach. Karl Detzer, who grew up in 
Fort Wayne, Indiana, during the turn of the century, knew 
the historian as a friend of his mother. Detzer remembered 
Dunn as a "gentle, hulking, pipe-smoking seemingly very old 
man . . . who strained tremendously interesting conversation 
through a mustache of heroic proportions." The two often 
explored northeast Indiana for artifacts, and through Dunn 
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Detzer learned that history did not merely consist of facts 
printed in books, but instead consisted of "a swamp where 
your feet sank into deep Indiana muck; or a sandbar across a 
creek; or a trail winding through willow thickets to what 
looked like an ordinary low hump of earth; or a faint, 
narrow path zigzagging up to a high point where you 
saw down below, not just the prosperous new red barns with 
their Mail Pouch Tobacco signs, but the glorious past that 
17 helped erect them." 
Also noting Dunn's thoroughness when it came to 
research was his daughter, Caroline. To her, her father 
always seemed to be "forever rushing around trying to see 
some old Indianapolis person before he died in order to get 
his recollections of early days. 1118 Jacob Dunn's great 
"intellectual curiosity," said his daughter, marked him for 
life a person who is "always reaching for a dictionary or 
encyclopedia, trying to identify a new flower . . . or 
running down some historical item!" 19 Calling Dunn a 
"delightful father," Caroline Dunn also remembered that he 
often took his daughters and other children in the 
neighborhood with him for walks in the country, where he 
indulged in his hobby of mushroom collecting, never 
returning home without filling a couple of sacks full of the 
fungi. For his extensive studies on the language of the 
Miami Indians, Caroline Dunn noted, her father made a number 
of trips to Oklahoma to talk to members of the tribe and 
also consulted with Miami interpreters still in Indiana. 
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"Meanings and derivations, grammar and changes in word 
forms, had for him the fascination of a puzzle or problem to 
be worked out," she observed. Her father also was "keenly 
aware of the need of preserving a record of the Indian 
languages before they should be lost through disuse. 1120 
Dunn's interest in history, he acknowledged, had been 
held through the years "chiefly by the detective problems it 
presents--the puzzles, great and small, that confront the 
historical student on all sides." If he were to teach a 
class in historical research he would instruct his students 
to follow the maxim set by Monsieur Lecog, a detective in a 
French mystery series: ''In any mysterious case, suspect what 
seems probable; examine carefully what seems improbable, or 
even impossible." Dunn went on to counsel his would-be 
students that if there is "a single fact, of which you are 
absolutely certain, which is inconsistent with your theory, 
there must be something wrong with the theory." The one, 
constant factor in human history, no matter what nationality 
or time period, according to Dunn, was human nature. He went 
on to say: 
The things that are subject to change are manners, customs, 
knowledge, beliefs, moral standards, and the like. Hence, be 
cautious about applying the standards of today to other 
ages. Put yourself as nearly as possible in the place of the 
characters you are s~pdying, and estimate probabilities from 
their point of view. 
His relentless quest to seek out knowledge and impart 
it to others could be more than a little exasperating to 
Dunn's colleagues. David Laurance Chambers, president of the 
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Indianapolis publishing firm Bobbs-Merrill, and like Dunn a 
member of the Indianapolis Literary Club, remembered one 
occasion when the Hoosier historian thoroughly puzzled famed 
novelist Henry James. According to Chambers, during a visit 
to Indianapolis James was the guest of honor at a special 
luncheon at the University Club "where he [James] was 
expected to do all the talking. But Jake Dunn took over and 
Henry didn't have a chance. Jake expatiated on his 
experiences while paying his way through college." After the 
luncheon, James turned to Chambers and asked: "Who was the 
extraordinary fellah who had been a waiter? 1122 
Finding documents and other materials on which to base 
his historical work proved to be a struggle for Dunn, 
especially when he attempted to gain access to archives in 
the East. Hearing about a large collection of documents 
relating to the Northwest Territory located in the State 
Department in Washington, D.C., Dunn, during Democratic 
President Grover Cleveland's first term in office, used his 
friendship with Indiana Senator Joseph E. McDonald, in whose 
law firm he had worked and who knew Secretary of State 
Thomas Francis Bayard, to secure permission to examine the 
material. "Notwithstanding my formidable introduction, I 
came near having to fight for everything I got," said Dunn. 
It seems that the librarian assisting Dunn was a "scion of a 
notable New England family." The librarian insisted on 
watching the Hoosier historian "like a hawk; and the way he 
glared at me when, on being informed that they did not have 
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something I wanted, I insisted in looking for myself--which 
I had discovered was the only way of making sure of anything 
at Washington--was literally and truly fierce." 23 
Dunn also had trouble in pursuing his historical 
research back home in Indiana. In his investigations he came 
across a comatose organization, the Indiana Historical 
Society. Appalled by the difficulty in obtaining state 
records, and the lack of care accorded to those materials 
already in hand, Dunn joined with two other men, William H. 
English, Democratic nominee for vice president .in 1880, and 
Republican judge Daniel Wait Howe, both respected amateur 
historians in their own right, to reorganize the Society, 
which had been in existence since 1830. Dunn became the 
IHS's recording secretary in 1886; he continued in that 
post, and remained active in other Society matters, until 
his death in 1924. Dunn had distinct ideas on the qualities 
he wanted in a Society member. While it had once offered 
membership to all, the Society in its new incarnation became 
an elite organization, with members elected by secret ballot 
and requiring a three-fourths majority. Dunn's work on 
behalf of the Society, however, came without financial 
emoluments, so he had to look elsewhere to support 
himself. 24 
In 1888 Dunn became head of the Democratic State 
Central Committee's literary bureau, essentially offering 
his considerable writing skills to the party. His efforts in 
the election caught the eye of the New York Times, which 
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called Dunn "one of the leading young Democrats of the 
State, and but for the quiet tastes which lead him into 
literary work he might aspire to higher honors. 1125 This was 
the beginning of his long career as a "political man of 
letters," who earned his living as "a professional 
26 Democrat." Dunn was elected state librarian (the only 
state position in history available in those days before 
there was a state archives or Indiana Historical Bureau) by 
the Indiana legislature in 1889 and 1891, served on the 
Indiana Public Library Commission for twenty years, was 
Indianapolis city controller for two terms (1904 to 1906 and 
1914 to 1916), and served as chief deputy to Marion County 
Treasurer Frank P. Fishback from 1910 to 1912. While serving 
in these posts, Dunn contributed to a number of Indianapolis 
newspapers. He wrote and served as editor for a time at the 
Indianapolis Sentinel, and produced articles for the 
Indianapolis Journal, Indianapolis News, Indianapolis Star, 
and Indianapolis Times. He found time on 23 November 1892 to 
marry, when he wed Charlotte Elliott Jones, daughter of 
Aquilla and Flora (Elliott) Jones. In 1902 Dunn made his 
only attempt at a major elective office when he ran a losing 
race against Republican incumbent Jesse Overstreet for 
Indiana's Seventh Congressional District. 
Dunn aided the Democratic party the most through his 
journalistic career, which was largely spent writing for 
"party organs"--newspapers aligned with a particular 
political organization (in Dunn's case, the Democratic 
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Indianapolis Sentinel). Fellow newspaper veteran and future 
Washington correspondent and congressman Louis Ludlow 
recalled that at the Sentinel office there existed one 
overriding dictate for guiding the staff: "Never err against 
the Democratic Party." Conversely, he continued, it was a 
matter of course that if "there was any erring to be done it 
should be done against the Republican Party." 27 Claude 
Bowers, a Democrat and self-trained Hoosier historian in his 
own right, also worked on the Sentinel for a time. He said 
that the news stories contained in the partisan press, 
"while colored, deceived no one. With papers representing 
both parties, the public had the advantage of a debate, so 
important in a democracy. 1128 
In championing the Democrat party's interests, however, 
Dunn kept intact his strong belief in the power of honest 
government. When one Democratic official wrote that the 
Sentinel, through Dunn's editorials, had been too hard on 
the party, Dunn responded by lecturing his critic like a 
teacher correcting a wayward student. He wrote: 
The worst enemy to any party is the man elected to office 
who violates the party pledges and brings on the party the 
disgrace and humiliation of obtaining goods under false 
pretenses. The betrayed party ought to be the first to 
demand his punishment. The people are interested in good 
government more than in party success, and if a party wants 
success it must give the people good government. There is 
nothing to be gained by attempting to whitewash guilty or 
incompetent officials. The people are not fools. The 
democratic party in Indiana never prospered as it has s~~ce 
it inaugurated the policy of punishing its own rascals. 
The Democratic reformer would have his chance to put to 
the test the power of his convictions following the 
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presidential election of 1888, which pitted Indiana's own 
Benjamin Harrison as the GOP candidate against incumbent 
Democrat Grover Cleveland. The election, won by Harrison 
thanks in part to carrying his home state, featured the 
usual corruption as each party scrambled to sway voters to 
its cause using all means, fair and foul. The motto of both 
major parties, Century Magazine said, seemed to be that "if 
we don't buy all the votes we can, our opponents will buy 
enough to carry the election, and that will never do. We 
must fight their corruption with greater corruption, because 
our own cause is so much purer and nobler and more patriotic 
than theirs. 1130 These abuses, which had been accepted as a 
matter of course by Hoosiers in the past, were so flagrant 
that the public demanded reform. Dunn saw his opportunity 
and he took full advantage of his chance to finally cleanse 
the nineteenth state's squalid ballot box. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Presidential Election of 1888 and the Australian Ballot 
Issue in Indiana 
Voting in Indiana during the late nineteenth century 
was a simple matter. Under the state's election laws 
political parties, not state officials, printed and 
furnished ballots to voters. The only state law regarding 
ballots required that they be printed on plain white paper 
three inches wide. 1 The practice of allowing political 
organizations to furnish ballots, a common one throughout 
the country in the 1880s, made it easy to bribe a class of 
voter known as a "floater," a person with no fixed party 
allegiance who sold his franchise to the highest bidder, be 
it Democrat or Republican. Party workers could buy these 
votes for as little as $2 or as high as $20 in tight 
elections. 2 These workers could ensure that once a floater 
was bought, he stayed bought, because, according to Eldon 
Cobb Evans's history of the Australian voting system in the 
Unites States, they were "permitted to have full view of the 
voter's ticket from the time it was given him until it was 
dropped in the ballot box." 3 
The number of floating votes in Indiana was estimated 
to have been ten thousand in the 1880 election, but as high 
as twenty thousand in 1888. 4 Indiana University Professor R. 
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H. Dabney, in a letter to The Nation, went as far as to 
assert that the floating vote in Indiana during the 1888 
election reached as high as thirty thousand. He told of one 
Bloomington resident who attempted to buy butter on election 
day but was told by a storekeeper that none was available--
it had all been bought the day before to "butter sandwiches 
for floaters--for it would seem that even the Hoosier 
floater cannot live by free whiskey alone." 5 
Hoosier party workers went to unusual lengths to 
capture the floating vote. Thomas Marshall, Indiana governor 
and vice president, noted in his memoirs that it was not 
unusual to ''corral what was known as the floating vote, fill 
it full of redeye, lock it up the night before the election 
and march it to the polls early the next morning." A veteran 
poll watcher, Marshall knew of one Republican who planned to 
keep a floater in his room all night to guarantee that he 
voted the GOP ticket the next day. An enterprising Democrat, 
however, set fire to a nearby woodshed and cried out that 
the Republican's store was on fire. When his opponent ran 
off to make sure his business was safe, Marshall said, "the 
Democrat stole his chattel. 116 
Attempts by both parties to capture the floating vote 
played a key role in the 1888 presidential contest in 
Indiana. In spite of Benjamin Harrison's favorite son 
status, the state was still up for grabs with both sides 
maneuvering desperately to win. The Indianapolis Journal 
reported in a 2 November 1888 editorial that it was the 
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floating vote "that the machinery and work of the contending 
parties are designed to influence . and nobody but a 
ninny-hammer would dream of anything else. 117 Walter Q. 
Gresham, who had battled Harrison for the Republican 
presidential nomination, was informed by Chicago attorney 
Robert T. Lincoln that W. H. H. Miller, Harrison's law 
partner, and Harrison's son, Russell, had visited him and 
asked for money to use for bribing Indiana voters. "The 
purchase of votes," Gresham wrote Noble Butler, "is carried 
on by both parties with little effort at concealment. If the 
thing goes on unchecked a catastrophe is inevitable. What is 
to become of us? 118 
With Cleveland and Harrison running neck and neck, the 
Republican campaign in Indiana and throughout the country 
was rocked by the uncovering of the infamous "blocks of 
five" letter from William Dudley, a Hoosier civil War 
veteran who served as GOP national committee treasurer in 
the 1888 election. In the letter, which was sent to Indiana 
Republican county chairmen, Dudley warned that "only boodle 
and fraudulent votes and false counting of returns can beat 
us in the State [Indiana]." To counter this threat, he 
advised GOP workers to find out what Democrats at the polls 
were responsible for bribing voters and steer committed 
Democratic supporters to them, thereby exhausting the 
opposition's cash stockpile. The most damaging part of the 
letter, however, appeared in a sentence that became 
synonymous with political corruption. Dudley advised: 
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"Divide the floaters into blocks of five, and put a trusted 
man, with necessary funds, in charge of these five, and make 
9 them responsible that none get away." 
GOP officials in Indiana took Dudley's counsel to 
heart. J. W. Jenks, who covered the 1888 presidential 
election for Century Magazine, reported that in one Hoosier 
county the chairman of the Republican committee discovered 
on the day before the election that his party and the 
Democrats had about the same money available to use to 
influence voters at the polls, approximately two or three 
thousand dollars. Expecting a tight contest, the chairman 
leaked word to influential Republicans that the Democrats 
had raised six thousand dollars. Summoning three wealthy GOP 
members to a meeting, an additional three thousand dollars 
was collected. "The next day [election day] the Republicans 
were in position to offer $40 a vote at the opening of the 
polls," Jenks wrote. "By ten o'clock the Democratic money 
was gone, and after that the Republicans could buy votes at 
th . . ,,10 e1r own pr1ce. 
This political dynamite in Dudley's letter managed to 
find its way to the opposition camp, albeit with a little 
help. A Democratic mail clerk on the Ohio & Mississippi 
Railroad, suspicious about the large amount of mail being 
passed from GOP headquarters to Indiana Republicans, opened 
one of the letters, recognized its value to his party, and 
passed the damaging contents on to the Indiana Democratic 
State Central Committee chairman. The letter was printed in 
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the Indianapolis Sentinel on 31 October 1888 under a banner 
headline reading "The Plot to Buy Indiana." Although an 
indignant Dudley and other top Republican officials declared 
that the letter was a forgery--and later claimed, correctly, 
that someone had been opening their mail--its contents 
received nationwide attention. The letter's revelations 
about political underhandedness, however, came too late to 
derail Harrison's campaign. The Hoosier Republican eked out 
a 2,300 vote plurality in Indiana. Cleveland won the 
nationwide popular vote, but Harrison handily captured the 
Electoral College (233-168) and with that victory became 
.d t 11 pres1 en . 
After the election Harrison seemed blissfully unaware 
that political shenanigans might have played a role in his 
election. He told Senator Matt Quay of Pennsylvania, GOP 
national chairman, that "Providence has given us victory." 
Quay, a veteran politico who considered the new president a 
"political tenderfoot," was unmoved by Harrison's oratory. 
He later exclaimed to a Philadelphia journalist: "Think of 
the man! He ought to know that Providence hadn't a damn 
thing to do with it!" The president, Quay said, might "never 
know how close a number of men were compelled to approach 
the gates of the penitentiary _to make him President. 1112 
Meanwhile, the aftershock from Dudley's letter 
reverberated throughout the Hoosier state. Dunn, at that 
time in charge of literary work for the Democratic State 
Central Committee and Sentinel editor, saw in the continued 
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furor about the Dudley letter an opportunity to "stop the 
atrocious corruption in Indiana elections" by supporting the 
establishment of a secret ballot based on a method first 
developed in Australia in the 1850s. 13 
The Australian ballot system (also known as the 
"official" ballot), which was passed into law in that 
country in 1857-58, was a relatively new and novel way for 
Americans to vote. The first secret ballot law in the United 
States had been adopted for the city of Louisville, 
Kentucky, just nine months prior to the 1888 election. 
Massachusetts became the first state to approve the system 
shortly after Louisville enacted its law. The Australian 
voting method was easy to understand; the government became 
responsible for printing and distributing ballots to voters 
and each polling place had to provide a way for voters to 
mark their ballots in secret. Reformers argued that this 
method of exercising suffrage would help eliminate vote 
buying "by removing the knowledge of whether it had been 
successful. 1114 
Hoping to see the Australian system introduced in 
Indiana, Dunn, as part of his campaign on behalf of the new 
voting method, called on Lafayette P. Custer, an 
Indianapolis labor leader, an~, according to Dunn, the only 
man he could find in the entire city of Indianapolis able to 
write intelligently on the election reform issue. In an 
article for the Sentinel, Custer outlined the six main 
features of the Australian system: printing and distributing 
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the ballots at public expense; enabling a voter to mark his 
ballot in secrecy; regulating the methods used to select 
candidates; defining bribery; defining "undue influence" 
upon voters; and limiting the amount a candidate could spend 
on an election. The floating vote, Custer predicted, would 
continue to increase each year under the present ballot 
system in Indiana since it allowed "the landlord, money lord 
and corporate wealth generally to levy tribute on the 
masses." If some way was not found to limit the influence of 
political managers, Custer continued, "we might as well call 
free government a farce." Noting those critics who argued 
that bribery could still exist even under the Australian 
system, the labor leader answered them by pointing out that 
"the briber would not trust a voter who would be guilty of 
selling his vote. A man could sell his vote to a dozen men 
if buyers could be found and after all vote his own 
sentiments and no one be the wiser. 1115 
Custer's article, with Dunn's editorial endorsement, 
appeared in the Sentinel on 19 November 1888. The Democratic 
newspaper continued to beat the drum on behalf of election 
reform as the 1889 Indiana legislative session neared. The 
reform effort had an immediate impact. In a manner that 
f9reshadowed his work on a new Indiana constitution in 1911, 
Dunn placed his imprint on the Australian ballot issue. 
After a meeting with outgoing Democratic Governor Isaac P. 
Gray, and subsequent sessions that included input from 
several legislators, the historian wrote an Australian 
ballot bill for consideration by the General Assembly. 16 
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Dunn's attempt at election reform benefited from the 
simple fact that the 1889 legislature was dominated by one 
party; the Democrats controlled both the House and Senate. 
But even newly elected Republican Governor Alvin P. Hovey 
called for action to transform the state's corrupt election 
voting process. In his inaugural address to the lawmakers on 
14 January 1889, Hovey admitted that the ballot in Indiana, 
and in many other states, had been debased. He leveled blame 
at both political parties, noting that the situation was so 
bad that "in the eyes of many respectable men, it [bribing 
voters] seems to be no longer regarded as a crime." The 
governor recommended to the legislators that the state's 
election laws be revised and even offered a proposal whereby 
every elected official would be required in his oath of 
office to swear that he had "not directly or indirectly 
given, promised, advanced, or paid any money, or given or 
conveyed any other article of value to any person or persons 
to aid, assist, or procure his election or appointment. 1117 
Even with the GOP governor's plea for reform, Dunn, as 
he had with his editorials for the Sentinel, had trouble 
convincing his fellow Democrats to support a measure to 
revise the existing voting system. He recalled that one 
longtime party official "insisted to the last that he 
preferred the old system, 'so that he could take a floater 
back of the schoolhouse, and mark his ticket for him.'" What 
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emerged from the General Assembly was the second secret 
ballot law ever passed by a state and one that became a 
model for other states to follow. Commenting on the law, 
Dunn noted that it was a modified version of a proposal 
originally made by a New York reform organization. One merit 
of Indiana's version, according to Dunn, was that each party 
could check on the doings of the other, as Democrats and 
Republicans had equal representation on election boards. 
Under the new system the state, no longer the political 
parties, furnished the ballots for use on election day. 
Unlike other versions of the Australian system, however, the 
Hoosier law reflected the strong party loyalties in the 
state by featuring a "party-column" ballot, which listed the 
nominees with their political party affiliations, giving 
voters the opportunity to mark a straight-ticket vote. 18 
As he acknowledged after the bill's passage, Dunn 
pushed for the Australian ballot system not only because he 
wanted to cleanse the corrupt system that was in place in 
the state, but also for less altruistic politically 
motivated reasons. Honest elections were needed, he argued, 
because his party could not successfully compete with the 
GOP's "election rascality" since the Democratic party, 
because of its support for tariff reduction, faced 
continuous opposition from "the capitalist element and 
it [business] furnished the funds [to the GOP] for vote 
buying." 19 He also charged that with the Republican control 
of the federal court system through their party's patronage 
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power, court officials were more inclined to "punish 
20 Democratic scoundrels and release Republican scoundrels." 
With those "facts" in mind, Dunn reasoned that the best hope 
for Democratic success at the polls was to have "intelligent 
and honest voters, and not ... ignorant and corrupt ones." 
For the Democratic party to flourish, he continued, "honesty 
is the best policy from political as well as other 
considerations." 21 
Instituting the modified Australian ballot system in 
Indiana--and in the thirty-seven other states that passed 
similar laws by 1892--failed to completely stop corruption 
at the ballot box, a fact its proponents freely admitted. It 
did, however, provide an essential initial step in helping 
secure honest elections for Indiana and other states. In a 2 
January 1890 editorial, the Indianapolis News lavished 
praise on the Democrats for what it called a "magnificent 
reform." Referring to the Hoosier state's previous 
reputation for notoriously corrupt elections, the News said 
that "nothing of late years had done more for the State's 
good name than the fact of this law." 22 Voters could now 
make their election choices in private, eliminating, as one 
scholar described it, the "intimidating party aura" that had 
. t d d th ld t' t 23 ex1s e un er e o vo 1ng sys em. 
To Dunn's way of thinking, however, the Australian 
ballot system constituted an incomplete reform. Along with 
the new voting arrangement, the legislature had passed a 
bribery law that Dunn claimed made the 1890, 1892, and 1894 
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elections "the cleanest that had been known in Indiana for 
years." The bribery law's effectiveness was emasculated by 
subsequent Republican legislation, according to Dunn. 
Consequently, although the Australian system secured orderly 
elections with diminished chances for voter intimidation, he 
said it fell short of eliminating vote buying outright. What 
was needed, Dunn argued, were voting laws "based on 
educational qualifications, and all suffrage conditioned on 
24 payment of taxes." 
Dunn's hope for continued improvement of Indiana's 
ballot--and success for the Democratic party come election 
time--endured a long fallow period. With the end of Claude 
Matthew's term in 1897, twelve years passed before a 
Democrat again sat in the governor's chair. In 1909, 
however, the Democrats days of wandering in the political 
wilderness ended as a man Dunn termed the "ablest" 
Democratic governor since Thomas Hendricks took over the 
office. 25 In Thomas Riley Marshall, Dunn found a Democratic 
politician willing to go along with his quest to secure an 
honest and intelligent electorate. Before continuing that 
crusade, however, Dunn became involved in a reform effort 
that took root in Indianapolis's muddy streets--a new city 
charter. 
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CHAPTER III 
Dunn and the 1891 Indianapolis City Charter 
Indianapolis in the last half of the nineteenth century 
was a bustling, thriving city. Just seventy years after 
commissioners appointed by the Indiana General Assembly 
convened at John McCormick's tavern and agreed on a site for 
a new state capital at the confluence of the West Fork of 
the White River and Fall Creek, the population of the 
central Indiana city had surpassed one hundred thousand--a 
growth rate surpassing even that of Los Angeles's first 
seventy years. 1 For entertainment, citizens took the 
streetcar to Fairview Park, located northwest of the city, 
or were treated to performances by such great names as the 
Barrymores, Lilly Langtry, and Sarah Bernhardt at the 
English Opera House or the Park Theater. For refreshment 
before or after a performance, residents of the Circle City 
could visit numerous German beer gardens and saloons. 
Business and industry also prospered. The Indianapolis 
Herald reported that in 1888 the city contained 892 
factories producing an annual product of $49,000,000 and 
supported 1,416 retail stores and 398 wholesale houses. 2 
Beneath the feet of busy Indianapolis pedestrians 
lurked a problem; the streets used for travel and commerce 
were often in appalling condition. The level surface and 
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rich soil that had attracted the state commissioners to pick 
Indianapolis as the site for the new capital were perfect 
for agricultural purposes, noted Dunn, but they "were 
serious drawbacks in the drainage and street construction of 
a city." Streets were generally paved with boulders or 
cobblestones, which created a bumpy ride for vehicles and 
dangers for pedestrians--the uneven surface collected water 
and other, more foul, substances deposited by horse-drawn 
wagons and carriages that often splashed unsuspecting 
3 passersby. 
A few attempts were made by the city government to 
improve the quality of Indianapolis's roadways, but most of 
the changes were hardly better than what had existed before. 
Cedar blocks were used to pave Meridian Street between New 
York and Seventh (now Sixteenth Street) street in 1882, but 
the blocks soon fell into disrepair. Six years later, the 
city tried again. Washington Street from Mississippi (now 
Senate Avenue) to Alabama streets was paved with an asphalt 
material known as Vulcanite at a cost of $74,488.68. A 
satisfactory enough surface in cold weather, the paving 
turned into the consistency of chewing gum in hot weather, 
causing Indianapolis citizens to nickname it "'the Yucatan 
4 pavement. '" 
Although failures, Dunn noted that these efforts were 
helpful in that they educated "intelligent people to the 
importance of some adequate authority to take charge of 
public improvements." The 1889 Indiana General Assembly took 
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the first step toward solving the problem by passing a bill 
establishing a Board of Public Works for Indianapolis. This 
"excellent measure," said Dunn, had only one problem. The 
bill provided that members of the first board would be 
elected by the General Assembly (Democratic in this 
instance); their successors would be appointed by the 
Indianapolis mayor (a Republican at the time). Republican 
Mayor Caleb Denny refused to approve the bonds of both the 
members of this first Board of Works and those of a police 
and fire department board also approved by the legislature. 
"This left matters, at the close of 1889, where they were at 
the beginning," Dunn said. 5 
Two actions, however, helped to pave the way for 
improved Indianapolis streets. At the 1889 session of the 
General Assembly, Senator James M. Barrett of Allen County, 
who also engineered the passage of the Australian ballot 
reform measure through the legislature, introduced a measure 
that made it easier for property owners to pay for 
improvements over a ten-year period through the issuance of 
bonds. The Barrett Law, as it became known, not only 
promoted public improvements in Indiana's cities and towns 
but also was used as a model in other states. In 
Indianapolis alone from 1890 to 1909, a total of 
$5,546,061.89 in these Barrett Law bonds were issued. 
According to Dunn, the new law "reconciled hundreds of men 
to the policy of public improvements on an extensive scale--
a scale that would have created intolerable burdens if the 
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expense had been obliged to be met in full on the completion 
of the work, as it was before. 116 
The second step to enhancing the capital city's 
roadways, and revising the way in which it was governed, 
came in 1890 with the creation of the Commercial Club, the 
forerunner of today's Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce. The 
brainchild of Indianapolis News reporter William Fortune and 
pharmaceutical entrepreneur Colonel Eli Lilly, the 
Commercial Club was organized in February 1890 "to promote 
the commercial and manufacturing interests and the general 
welfare of Indianapolis and vicinity." The organization 
immediately set out to heighten the public's awareness of 
the need to improve the city's avenues by sponsoring a 
Street Paving Exposition in April at Tomlinson Hall where 
paving companies from throughout the country exhibited their 
wares. Approximately twelve thousand people attended the 
four-day exposition, the first of its kind in the nation. 7 
Changing the character of Indianapolis's streets, 
however, was dependent upon revising another aspect of the 
city--its government. Indianapolis, like many growing urban 
centers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, discovered that it required a "more effective, 
positive city administration that could tackle community 
affairs and draw for support upon a sense of common concern 
for mutual problems," noted Samuel P. Hays in his study of 
the American urban scene from 1885 to 1914. Business leaders 
and reformers across the country, Hays argues, worked 
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together to establish in city governments "clearer lines of 
authority and to increase the mayor's power to appoint his 
subordinates and to initiate policy." 8 To accomplish this 
task the Commercial Club and its allies, which included 
Dunn, set about to alter the now-antiquated Indianapolis 
city charter. 
The Charter of 1853, which had been passed by the 
General Assembly following the adoption of the 1851 Indiana 
Constitution and applied to all cities with populations of 
three thousand or more, placed control of the municipality 
in the hands of the city council. The council had the power 
to levy taxes, annex property, appoint city officials, and 
pass ordinances for governing the city. Under this system 
the mayor enjoyed little authority, serving merely as the 
president of the board of councilmen and also served as 
police court judge. 
On 10 March 1890 the Commercial Club sponsored a 
meeting at the Indianapolis Board of Trade Hall devoted to 
the city charter. At that meeting, a resolution was passed 
calling on the Commercial Club's board of directors to 
appoint a committee whose job would be to "consider the 
matter of revising the laws governing the city, the 
formulation of new laws believed to be needed, and the 
embodiment of the same in a bill covering the entire subject 
of city government." The next day, the Club's board selected 
as members of the committee Augustus L. Mason, a local 
attorney; Samuel E. Morss, Indianapolis Sentinel publisher; 
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and Granville S. Wright, a city alderman. Joining these 
prominent men on the panel were Mayor Thomas L. Sullivan, 
Board of Aldermen President Isaac J. Thalman, and City 
Council Finance Committee Chairman William Wesley Woollen. 
Dunn noted that the committee had been organized on a 
nonpartisan basis, with Morss and Sullivan keeping the 
Democratic party abreast of developments, while Thalman and 
Wright did the same for the GOP. 9 
The group met in an office located at 90 1/2 East 
Market Street throughout the summer of 1890 with "tireless 
regularity," said Dunn, and without the use of "stimulants." 
After they had finished their work for the evening, he 
noted, the committee refreshed themselves not with alcoholic 
beverages, but with soft drinks. In preparing a new city 
charter, the committee used as a model two basic examples: 
Philadelphia's Bullitt Law, which authorized the mayor to 
appoint a board of public works and other officers, and the 
city charter of Brooklyn, which was constructed on the 
federal plan with a division of government into legislative, 
judicial, and executive branches. 10 
After ten months of effort, the committee issued a new 
city charter the main feature of which, according to Dunn, 
was the "entire separation of the executive, legislative and 
judicial functions, all administrative functions being 
transferred to the executive department." Most of the power 
behind city government now lay in the hands of the mayor. 
Under the new charter, the person in that office appointed 
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the board of public works, the board of public safety, the 
board of health, and the city engineer. These appointments 
did not have to be approved by the city council and the 
mayor could, at any time, remove from office those he 
appointed. "The mayor," said Dunn, "is really made the key-
stone of the arch." This fact made it doubly important for 
the people to, as Dunn put it, "select the very best 
material in electing a mayor." Because the new charter 
lodged great power in city officials, he warned voters that 
Indianapolis's welfare depended "chiefly on the character of 
the officials selected"--an admonition that would come back 
to haunt Dunn later during his second stint as city 
controller. 11 
Introduced before the Indiana General Assembly on 9 
January 1891 as House Bill Number 44, the measure received a 
less than enthusiastic response from some members of the 
Marion County delegation in the General Assembly. At a 
meeting involving the Commercial Club committee, 
Indianapolis lawmakers, and other interested citizens 
(including Dunn) held at the State House on 22 January, 
General John Coburn, a former congressman and prominent 
local attorney, denigrated the bill as providing for "an 
absolute monarchy for the city of Indianapolis--the Mayor 
electing the sub-officers and not the people. I have not had 
an opportunity to carefully study it, but tonight, after 
coming into this room, I read some of its provisions, and I 
was amazed." After Coburn had finished his remarks, William 
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P. Fishback, who had spoken in favor of the new charter, 
turned to Dunn and whispered, "Just wait and see Gus skin 
him." Augustus L. (Gus) Mason did just that. "The General's 
theory of local self-government is a good one," acknowledged 
Mason, but it did not apply in this case because of his 
"ignorance of the bill in question" and "his absolute 
misstatements" regarding its provisions. Coburn later called 
12 Mason's remarks "beneath contempt." 
Although Dunn had intended to attend the meeting only 
as an "'innocent bystander,'" the reformer, once engaged, 
had to offer his suggestions on the matter. When asked for 
his opinion, Dunn said that he favored the measure but, 
because of the possibility of gerrymandering, he urged that 
the board of aldermen be elected on the general ticket by 
all of the city's voters. Also, Dunn noted that the board of 
public works had "unrestricted power in the matter of street 
improvements." With this in mind, he suggested that if a 
majority of property owners on a street "did not want a 
proposed improvement they should have the right of 
remonstrance. 1113 
Both of Dunn's ideas influenced the final version of 
the bill (in which the board of alderman was eliminated), 
but his greatest contribution to the cause of the new 
Indianapolis charter arose from his political connections 
and his willingness to put aside partisan issues in favor of 
real reform for the city's government. During the debate on 
the new city charter, Dunn was serving as state librarian 
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and writing for the Indianapolis Sentinel. Utilizing the 
same detective skills that served him so well as a 
historian, he discovered that several people whom Morss 
trusted regarding the legislation were in fact ready to 
betray him. These people, members of Dunn's own party, had 
adopted the plan, according to Dunn in his history of 
Indianapolis, of allowing the charter to go through but of 
amending it by making the board of public works elective 
from three districts, one from the city north of Ohio Street 
and the other two south, divided by a north and south line. 
"It was supposed that this would insure two Democratic 
members, and the board of works was considered the one 
important thing in the whole system," Dunn said. 
Forewarned, Morss prepared a "scorching editorial" 
denouncing the plan. Revulsion over the plot prompted the 
Indianapolis News to jump on the bandwagon and urge that the 
new charter be passed. "As a whole we believe the scheme to 
be the soundest and best that has ever been devised, and an 
imperative requisite for the good career and fair progress 
of Indianapolis," the News proclaimed. Along with bringing 
more supporters into the fray, Dunn said that exposing the 
plot stopped the "double-dealing with the Sentinel," leaving 
the friends of the charter with "an open field, and their 
enemies all in front of them. 1114 
The new charter made its way rather easily through the 
Indiana House with only minor amendments, passing by a vote 
of 65 to 13 on 16 February 1891. The measure faced a tougher 
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battle, however, in the Senate, where it encountered, said 
Dunn, the one man in the General Assembly who opposed the 
measure "as a matter of disinterested principle"--Frank B. 
Burke, a Democrat from Clark County. The pragmatic Dunn 
grudgingly respected Burke for being a "brilliant genius," 
but claimed that the lawmaker's devotion to principle 
disqualified him from important legislative work "in which 
abstract principles in their logical extremes, have usually 
to be abandoned for the simple reason that that human beings 
do not live on a logical basis." Dunn partially agreed with 
the theory that great legislation was the product of 
compromise, but "only so far as the compromise is in the 
line of adapting it to actual human conditions, as against 
theories." In the case of the new city charter for 
Indianapolis, Burke opposed a section that authorized the 
board of works to purchase or build and operate water and 
electric utilities. "He (Burke] felt that true Democratic 
principles called for a vote of the people on such important 
matters," said Dunn. 15 In spite of Burke's opposition, the 
bill passed the Senate by a 42 to 3 vote on 3 March 1891 and 
was signed into law by Republican Governor Alvin P. Hovey 
16 three days later. 
Through his support for giving the mayor enormous 
authority for Indianapolis's government, Dunn sowed the 
seeds for his own political humiliation twenty-five years 
later. Appointed city controller by Democratic Mayor Joseph 
E. Bell in 1914, Dunn came under fire from the Indianapolis 
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News after two years in office for his practice of using 
interest earned on contractors' guaranty bonds for personal 
gain. According to the News in the spring of 1914 the board 
of public works ruled that checks submitted from the lowest 
bidder for municipal improvements should be deposited with 
the city controller instead of sitting uncashed in the board 
office until contracts were let. Although the certified 
checks from failed bidders on city contracts often were held 
by the clerk of the board of works, the newspaper alleged 
that sometimes a number of certified checks on the same 
contract would be turned over to Dunn's office. 
Dunn admitted to the News that he cashed such certified 
checks and "drew interest on such money held by him as 
'trustee' until the time came to settle with the 
contractors." Because the income from this source was very 
regular, the newspaper charged that Dunn probably had 
"considerable money from this source on hand at all times." 
Although there was no law prohibiting such a practice, and 
previous occupants of the office had also followed this 
custom, Mayor Bell ordered Dunn in December 1915 to cease 
collecting interest for his personal use. Records indicate 
that Dunn's office received $178,947 in certified checks in 
1914 and $181,915 in certified checks in 1915. 17 
Six months after the News's expose, Mayor Bell asked 
for and received Dunn's resignation, along with those of 
John Reddington, deputy city controller, and John Pugh, 
deputy auditor of the board of school commissioners. His 
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action, the mayor claimed, was on "account of the general 
condition that has existed in connection with his management 
of the office. The business of his office has been so 
conducted that much criticism has come to me concerning the 
management thereof." Although one of the reasons for Dunn's 
dismissal cited by Bell was the controller's practice of 
collecting interest for personal use, the News reported that 
Dunn was being made the scapegoat for irregularities 
conducted by political appointees. The newspaper noted that 
"it is a well-known fact that Dunn never appointed any of 
his assistants but that they were chosen by the mayor." 
Reddington, Pugh, and John Shaughnessy, a former bookkeeper 
in the controller's office, were indicted by a Marion County 
d . 18 gran Jury. 
It was, in fact, Dunn who first exposed the 
irregularities in his office when he had Shaughnessy 
arrested for forging the name of a local contractor, George 
W. McCrary, to a check made payable by the city controller 
to McCrary for $119.25. Later, Reddington and Pugh were 
charged with improperly collecting vehicle license fees 
between 1 July and 31 December 1915, turning over to the 
city only half of the fees charged. In an editorial titled 
"Dunn the Goat," the News noted it was commonly believed 
that the "incompetent party men whom the controller employed 
were thrust upon him, and that the 'higher-ups' are as much, 
if not more, to blame for the loose methods which the mayor 
now so heroically denounces and which have long prevailed in 
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the controller's office." Still, the editorial indicated the 
newspaper and community would have had more sympathy for 
Dunn if he had "taken the initiative and cleaned out the 
political stables himself. 1119 
Ever faithful to the party he supported throughout his 
life, Dunn refused to place the blame for his troubles on 
Bell, who had the power to kick the controller out of office 
because of the 1890-91 city charter Dunn helped to 
institute. Asked by an Indianapolis Star reporter if he 
planned to resign without any ceremony, Dunn replied: "Why, 
of course I will." After the swearing-in of his successor, 
Reginald H. Sullivan (later mayor of Indianapolis), Dunn, as 
he left the controller's office for the last time, stopped 
long enough to issue the comment that he had "done nothing 
to apologize for and a man would be a fool in a case like 
this to talk about the rest of it. 1120 
In this matter Dunn had allowed his party spirit to 
overcome his zeal for reform. As the Indianapolis News 
pointed out, Dunn had been induced by the Democratic party 
to "commit himself to the defense of situations which, as a 
searcher after truth in his books, he hardly would have 
defended. 1121 But three years before he became city 
controller, the Hoosier historian had used the Democratic 
party, especially its standard-bearer in Indiana, Governor 
Thomas Marshall, to further what Dunn believed was a key to 
good government in the state: furnishing an honest 
electorate through a new Indiana Constitution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Dunn, Governor Thomas Marshall, and the Indiana Constitution 
At the opening of the Indiana General Assembly's sixty-
seventh session on 5 January 1911, Governor Thomas R. 
Marshall, a Democrat, addressed a legislature different from 
the one he had first appeared before two years earlier 
following his gubernatorial victory over Republican opponent 
James Watson. At that time power had been split between 
Democrats who controlled the House and Republicans who held 
a majority in the Senate. Democratic gains in the 1910 
election, however, gave that party majorities in both 
chambers for the 1911 session. Despite this partisan 
advantage Marshall's message to the lawmakers lent credence 
to his designation by many observers as a "Progressive with 
1 the brakes on." He called on the General Assembly to act on 
such issues as compulsory workmen's compensation, new child 
labor laws, and voter registration reform. Early in his 
speech the governor also noted that there were "certain 
provisions of our Constitution which do not meet present 
conditions." Although he did not wish to see the document 
"radically altered," the sixty-year-old Constitution was in 
need of some revisions, which would, among other things, 
curtail aliens' voting rights, increase the length of 
legislative sessions, and ease the often complicated 
constitutional amendment process. 2 
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Marshall softened his call for changes to the 1851 
Constitution by conceding to the legislators that there were 
"other important matters pending before you." Should these 
other matters be decided, Marshall continued, "it is not 
improbable that I shall again address you upon them [the 
Constitution revisions]." 3 The governor's offhand mention of 
possible changes in the Constitution was a poor indication 
of the legislative firestorm he would soon ignite. In a 
little over a month's time the General Assembly was in full 
partisan cry when it was presented with not just a few 
amendments or a call for a full-fledged constitutional 
convention, but rather an entirely new Indiana Constitution. 
Republican opponents blasted Marshall's action, terming it 
illegal and an usurpation of authority on the governor's 
part. If allowed to pass, warned GOP Representative Jesse E. 
Eschbach, the measure could "lead to internal strife and 
dissension and eventually revolution. 114 
The document that caused such bitter partisan bickering 
became known as the "Tom Marshall Constitution." Such a 
designation was misleading, however, since it had not been 
created after consultation by the governor with his usual 
friends and advisors, nor in the usual give-and-take of the 
legislative process. Instead, as Marshall's biographer 
Charles M. Thomas wrote years later, work on the new Indiana 
Constitution "had been done quietly in the Governor's 
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office." According to Thomas, the governor was "largely 
influenced by the advice of one man whom he relied upon to 
draft much of the constitution." 5 That one man was Dunn, who 
wrote the revised Constitution and suggested a way around 
the usually cumbersome constitutional amendment process in 
Indiana by bypassing the usual reform methods for the more 
radical approach of introducing the new document to the 
lawmakers. Once it passed the legislature it would be 
presented to Hoosier voters for ratification at the 1912 
election and, if successful, would become law. 
Dunn had pinned his chance for the betterment of 
Indiana's ballot, to his mind, the key feature of the new 
Constitution, on Marshall's coattails. Since the passage of 
the Australian ballot law in 1889, Dunn had seen that law 
continually weakened; he yearned for a chance to once again 
put matters right. He discovered a willing partner in the 
governor, a Columbia city lawyer who was one of the 
unlikeliest candidates ever for Indiana's highest office. 
Although he had been involved in Democratic party 
activities for most of his life, and had even formed a 
Democratic Club while a student at Wabash College, 
Marshall's only experience in seeking office had been his 
failed bid for prosecuting attorney. After losing that race, 
Marshall returned to his law practice in Columbia city and 
continued to be active in party affairs. He served two years 
as the Twelfth District Democratic Committee chairman and 
was even asked to run for Congress in 1906, an honor he 
declined. When asked if he might someday consider another 
campaign for elective office, Marshall said he doubted he 
ever would again, unless that race happened to be for 
6 governor. 
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The "Marshall for Governor" bandwagon started rolling 
in earnest in the early fall of 1907. While Marshall and his 
wife were on vacation in northern Michigan, longtime Indiana 
newspaper reporter and Washington correspondent Louis 
Ludlow, Marshall's friend, became the first journalist to 
put forward the Columbia City lawyer's name as a 
gubernatorial candidate. Ludlow's suggestion was immediately 
picked up by newspapers throughout northern Indiana.In 
addition to this editorial support, delegates to the 
Democratic state convention from the Twelfth District 
pledged their votes on Marshall's behalf. 7 
The Democratic state convention held 25 March 1908 at 
Tomlinson Hall in Indianapolis displayed a party in 
disarray. Forces loyal to longtime Democratic boss Thomas 
Taggart lined up in support of his hand-picked gubernatorial 
candidate, Samuel Ralston, who would eventually succeed 
Marshall as governor. Meanwhile, those opposing Taggart's 
control of the party touted the candidacy of State Senator 
L. Ert Slack. Commenting on the intraparty divisions, 
Marshall noted that is was "a difficult thing to find a man 
who was a Democrat--just a plain, unadorned, undiluted, 
unterrified Democrat." With the convention deadlocked after 
four ballots, Ralston--pressed to do so by his patron 
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Taggart--announced his withdrawal from the race. With 
Ralston's departure, voters quickly switched to Marshall, 
and he received his party's nomination for governor on the 
subsequent ballot. The dark horse, as Marshall put it, had 
transformed himself "from his Accidency to His Excellency." 8 
With the Democratic party firmly united behind his 
candidacy, Marshall turned his efforts to convincing Hoosier 
voters that he was the best man for the job. He conducted a 
low-key campaign, telling the crowds that gathered to hear 
him speak he was the "candidate of no faction and candidate 
of no interest; that I had no strings to me; no promises 
out; owed nobody anything except good will; that I had a 
perfectly good [law] practice at home; did not care whether 
I was elected or not; but if they were in accord with 
Democratic principles I was soliciting their votes for the 
party and not for myself." Marshall even claimed to have 
returned more than $7,000 in campaign funds he received in 
the mail. Instead of using those funds, he borrowed $3,750 
from Columbia City's First National Bank to finance his 
campaign for governor, an amount he repaid only after 
finishing his two subsequent terms as vice president under 
Woodrow Wilson. 9 
While Marshall's understated campaign style proved to 
be effective with Hoosiers, Congressman James Watson, the 
Republican gubernatorial nominee, experienced difficulties 
within his own party. Governor J. Frank Hanly, a tireless 
advocate of temperance, had prodded the Republican party 
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into including in its platform a plank calling for a county 
option law on the liquor question. With this pledge on the 
books, Hanly went one step farther. Three weeks before the 
election he called a special session of the General Assembly 
that ultimately passed the county option measure (Democrats 
had favored using the city, township, or ward as the basis 
to decide the question of whether or not liquor should be 
allowed in an area) . 
The Democratic candidate fiercely opposed Hanly's use 
of executive power. Speaking in Rockport before the special 
session got under way, Marshall unwittingly foreshadowed 
attacks that later would be leveled against him in his 
attempt at constitutional reform when he compared Hanly to a 
dictator giving orders with no thought as to what the people 
might really want. Such actions, said Marshall, were a 
"violation of constitutional government, for under a 
constitutional government the people themselves rule." 10 
Watson also disputed the wisdom of Hanly's legislative 
posturing, but he had a more personal stake in the matter. 
He blamed Hanly's insistence on obtaining passage of the 
county option law before the campaign's finish as a major 
reason why he would go on to lose the governor's race to 
Marshall. "When this was done," Watson insisted in his 
memoirs, "it took my platform squarely out from under me and 
thus relieved any Democrats who believed in county local 
option from the necessity of voting for me to get what they 
wanted." The Republican congressman acknowledged that 
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opposition from organized labor also played a role in his 
. t l . 11 approx1ma e y f1fteen thousand-vote defeat. 
Indiana governor during a time in American history when 
Progressives across the country were advocating such liberal 
governmental changes as the initiative, referendum, and 
recall, along with other measures to combat society's 
problems, Marshall nevertheless proved to be a cautious 
reformer. He advocated clear and equal separation of powers 
among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
government, with each branch minding its own business. The 
governor's wary approach to reform was highlighted in his 
opening message to the General Assembly on 11 January 1909 
in which he counseled the lawmakers to be cautious in 
enacting any new laws. "Undigested legislation," Marshall 
warned, "must inevitably result in evil to the body politic. 
Your record will be made not by the amount but by the 
character of the work you do. 1112 The divided General 
Assembly (Democrats controlled the House and Republicans the 
Senate) took Marshall's advice to heart. Although the 
governor had asked them to consider such reform measures as 
the direct election of United States senators, improved 
railroad and insurance company legislation, and the creation 
of a state board of accounts, only the last of these was 
enacted. 
Paradoxically, some Indiana historians have put forward 
the belief that the state's greatest attempt at reform came 
not during the Progressive era, but in the late 1890s. Dunn 
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was one of the first to champion this interpretation, noting 
that the legislature of 1889 "adopted more and better laws 
than any legislature that preceded or followed it, but what 
was of more importance, it set a pace for its successors." 13 
A more recent assessment agrees that those reforms pursued 
in later years, especially during the period from 1912 to 
1916, "merely modeled themselves on the precedents set in 
1889." 14 This is true of Dunn's efforts on behalf of a new 
state constitution, which he saw as continuing the work he 
had done in the last half of the nineteenth century to 
purify Hoosier elections. 
As disappointed as Marshall was with the legislative 
setbacks he suffered during the 1909 session, he seemed 
determined to keep clear the lines of authority among the 
different branches of government. Speaking before fellow 
Democrats at the party's 1910 convention, he cautioned his 
audience about the dangers of one-man government. Even 
though such a government might sometimes produce good laws, 
"in so doing, it will establish a precedent whereby an evil-
minded man may work intolerable wrong and overthrow our 
system." 15 Marshall believed that the state's chief 
executive should swear off using "his power, his prestige 
and his right of appointment to overawe or coerce the 
legislative department of government. 1116 
on one issue, however, Marshall swept aside his usual 
political beliefs in favor of the same domineering methods 
for which he had condemned his predecessor during the 
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gubernatorial campaign. The issue subjecting Marshall to an 
eventual avalanche of condemnation from Republicans was one 
that had bedeviled the state for a number of years: reform 
of the 1851 Indiana Constitution. The General Assembly had 
long debated ways to amend what had become an outdated 
document. These attempts met with repeated failures due to a 
complicated process for effecting constitutional revisions. 
According to terms outlined in the 1851 Constitution, any 
amendment had to be passed by two consecutive legislative 
sessions before it could be considered by Hoosier voters. 
The cumbersome amendment process was highlighted in the 
early 1900s when a lawyers group attempted to revise a 
constitutional provision that admitted to the bar applicants 
whose only qualification consisted of possessing a good 
moral character. A bill authorizing the General Assembly to 
set stricter qualifications for admission to the bar 
successfully passed two consecutive legislative sessions 
(1897 and 1899) and was placed on the ballot for voters to 
consider at the 6 November 1900 election. As a result of the 
election, in which the amendment received 240,031 votes in 
favor and 144,072 tallies against, sterner standards were 
established. 
On an appeal from a Hoosier who failed to meet the 
tougher requirements, however, the Indiana Supreme Court 
during its November 1900 term ruled in the case In re Denny 
that although the amendment received more "yes" than "no" 
votes, it had failed to pass because it did not receive a 
majority of all the votes cast in the general election. 
Furthermore, since the amendment had neither been approved 
nor defeated, but was still pending a decision from the 
voters, the 1851 Constitution stated that "no additional 
amendment or amendments could be proposed," which 
effectively blocked any other attempt at constitutional 
reform. 17 
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Such an impasse proved to be intolerable to a reformer 
like Dunn, who also saw in the constitutional roadblock a 
unique opportunity for enhancing the Democratic party's 
success in future elections. In a speech before the Indiana 
Democratic Club in December 1908 he pointed out that in a 
ten-year period from 1894 to 1904, other states had adopted 
two hundred and thirty constitutional amendments while 
Indiana had failed to successfully pass even one. Dunn 
blamed the framers of the 1851 Constitution for tying "the 
hands qf posterity too tightly. They seemed to have the idea 
that wisdom would die with them." He regarded the process 
for attaining constitutional amendments as a safety valve 
that should be "so adjusted as not to be a mere escape pipe 
for passing fancy or political prejudice, but at the same 
time should not require so much force to move it as is 
liable to explode the boiler. 1118 
To relieve what he regarded as a potentially explosive 
situation, the Hoosier historian lent his expertise to the 
Marshall administration by devising a novel, for Indiana and 
the rest of the nation, approach to constitutional reform. 
The first hints of what was to come appeared prior to a 
Democratic caucus the night of 13 February 1911. Although 
what was to be discussed at the meeting was theoretically 
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supposed to be a secret, the Indianapolis News reported that 
one of the issues to be considered was the state's 
Constitution. The newspaper noted unconfirmed reports that 
"an entirely new Constitution is to be proposed, another 
that certain phases of the document are to be gone over, and 
still another to the effect that the caucus will be asked to 
consider ways for making easier the method of amending the 
t . t t. . f . . 1 19 Cons 1 u 1on, 1 a way 1s found poss1b e." 
The News's sources were accurate; the next day Marshall 
announced that the caucus had approved the idea of 
submitting an act to the General Assembly providing for an 
entirely new Constitution--a method that had not been used 
successfully in the United States since the eighteenth 
century. 20 Marshall rationalized such an action on the 
grounds that the Declaration of Independence granted the 
people the right to change the method and form of their 
government. The changes included in the new Constitution, 
the governor asserted, had been decided upon after 
consultations with a group of Indiana attorneys. One of 
those lawyers, whom Marshall failed to identify by name, 
advised him that if he studied the existing Indiana 
Constitution he could find a means "to accomplish what I 
felt should be accomplished, and thus to get around the 
vexing question of whether there is a proposed amendment 
before the people." 21 
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The attorney Marshall refused to name was Dunn, who 
outlined his role in the matter in his history of the state, 
Indiana and Indianans. Dunn, who had praised Marshall's 
previous course of noninterference in other departments of 
government, reversed himself on this issue. He argued that 
the "radical action" of submitting a new Constitution to be 
acted on by the General Assembly was called for in order to 
cut the "Gordian knot" blocking constitutional reform. "The 
plan struck me as feasible, and he [Marshall] asked me to 
formulate the changes which I considered desirable, which I 
did," Dunn recalled. 22 
Direct action in the legislative process was, of 
course, nothing new to this political historian who has 
served a similar role in the Australian ballot and 
Indianapolis city charter issues. In fact, to Dunn's way of 
thinking an historian had an obligation to act when he saw a 
problem in government. "If you want intelligent 
legislation," he reasoned, "you must first find out just 
what is wrong, and then devise the remedy for that wrong. 1123 
In drafting his constitutional proposal, Dunn depended 
upon his historical knowledge and the skills he learned as 
an attorney and not on any detailed correspondence from 
Marshall. Caroline Dunn has suggested that since both her 
father and the governor lived in Indianapolis and were 
longtime Democrats, it would have been more likely for them 
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to discuss an issue like reforming the Constitution in 
24 person, rather than through the mails or by memo. She also 
noted that during the time when Marshall served as governor, 
her family and the Marshalls lived just a few blocks away 
from one another on Pennsylvania (Dunn's home was at 915 N. 
Pennsylvania, while the Marshalls lived at 1219 N. 
1 I ) 25 Pennsy van1a . 
The legal right to produce a new Constitution for the 
legislature to consider, claimed Dunn, rested upon the 
original document's statements that "the people have, at all 
times, an indefensible right to alter and reform their 
government," and that the state's "legislative authority 
shall be vested in the General Assembly." 26 Dunn pointed out 
that Indiana's 1816 Constitution contained no process for 
amending the document. The only rationale for replacing it, 
besides the people's inherent right to do so, was a 
provision it contained whereby every twelve years after the 
Constitution had taken effect a vote would be taken to see 
if people were for or against calling a constitutional 
t I 27 conven 1on. 
Such a vote had never been taken, and the 
constitutional convention had been called for only after the 
collapse of Indiana's internal improvements scheme in 1850. 
When considering the amendment process for the new 
Constitution, convention delegates realized the session 
failed to meet the procedures outlined for such matters in 
the 1816 Constitution. With that in mind, Dunn argued that 
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the delegates' aim was not to "limit the right of revision, 
but to extend it by the system of special amendment." He 
went on to claim: 
It is evident that the provisions for amendment . . . are 
not intended as any limitation on the right of the people to 
adopt a new constitution whenever they so desire . . . . The 
only restriction is that if they desire to proceed by 
special amendment . . . they must follow strictly the ~ethod 
there provided, in order to make the amendments valid. 
To those who charged that the "new" Constitution was no 
more than a series of amendments to the existing 
Constitution and, therefore, had to be dealt with by the 
amending procedures outlined in the 1851 document, Dunn said 
that they were confused about the "ordinary and legal 
meanings of terms." He gave as an example the changing of a 
will. If someone had made and then rewritten a will, "it 
would be a new will; but if the changes were added as a 
codicil it would be an amended will." The proposed 
constitution he drew up in 1911, Dunn argued, had to be 
considered as a new one "from the standpoint of the 
diversity of its effects. 1129 
The document Dunn produced and Marshall provided to the 
General Assembly for debate included such earlier reform 
attempts as granting the legislature the power to fix 
requirements for admission to the bar and increasing the 
size of the Indiana Supreme Court from five justices to as 
many as eleven. Other revisions included increasing the size 
of the Indiana House of Representatives to one hundred and 
thirty members; lengthening the General Assembly session to 
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one hundred days; giving the legislature the power to enact 
workmen's compensation laws and measures for the initiative, 
referendum, and recall of all elected officials, except 
judges; requiring a three-fifths vote by the House and 
Senate to override a governor's veto; giving the governor 
line-item veto power on appropriation bills; prohibiting 
salary increases for public officials during the term to 
which they were elected; easing the amending process for the 
Indiana Constitution; and providing political parties the 
opportunity to declare for or against constitutional 
amendments at their conventions and making such a decision a 
part of their tickets to be acted on by voters. 30 
Although Dunn's constitution provided for the 
initiative, referendum, and recall of public officials--
mainstays of Progressive-era political reform efforts--
Marshall, enhancing his image as a cautious reformer, 
approved the placement of that clause in the new 
Constitution with "no intention on my part that it should 
ever be used." He offered as an example someone approaching 
a set of railroad tracks. Even if the tracks were not 
equipped with warning signals, a person in "sound mind" 
would know there existed some danger in crossing the tracks. 
According to the governor, the initiative, referendum, and 
recall clause was put in the document Dunn prepared "not for 
use but to sharply call attention of the Legislator to the 
fact that he was the representative of the people and not 
the representative of a special interest and that he would 
better walk carefully or such a condition of affairs might 
arise as to make it necessary for the people to pass their 
own laws." 31 
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For Dunn, however, the chief purpose of the new 
Constitution was "to secure honest elections," without 
which, he argued, government would be "a sham and a 
mockery." 32 As with the Australian ballot measure, his 
underlying reason for attempting to create an honest 
electorate was simple: it would translate into election 
success for the Democratic party. Dunn earnestly believed 
that given a choice between the Democrat and Republican 
program, an honest, intelligent voter could not help but 
vote for the Democrats. What better way to ensure Democratic 
party success at the polls than to provide an environment in 
which this type of voter could prosper? He even went so far 
as to charge that Republican opposition to the new 
Constitution, which offered a "speedy and inexpensive" way 
to secure an honest electorate, was based on the GOP's 
"knowledge that it [the new Constitution] will injure that 
party politically." 33 
Like many Progressive-era reform proposals, however, 
Dunn's document was tainted by nativism, especially in its 
voting eligibility requirements. 34 The new Constitution 
restricted voting rights to male citizens of the United 
States more than twenty-one years of age who had resided in 
the state for twelve months, in a township for sixty days, 
and in a precinct for thirty days preceding the election. 
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(Under the then existing Constitution, every male of foreign 
birth more than twenty-one years of age who had declared his 
intention to become a United States citizen and had resided 
in the state for six months, and in the country for one 
year, was eligible to vote.) Dunn's measure also limited 
suffrage by insisting that voters pay their poll tax the 
year of any election, and, after 1 November 1913, it 
stipulated that Hoosiers who could "not read in English or 
some other known tongue any section of the Constitution of 
the State" would not be allowed to register to vote. 35 
Limiting suffrage to educated citizens became a common 
proposal during the Progressive era. A. James Reichley 
claims that a number of Progressives shared the Founding 
Fathers' belief that "republican government would be 
unworkable without well-informed, independent voters who 
cast their ballots for what is best for the nation as a 
whole"--a citizenship definition many immigrants failed to 
fit. 36 Also, the proposed Indiana Constitution's limit on 
voting rights to those who could read or write paralleled a 
national movement's attempt to require a literacy test for 
immigrants. First introduced in Congress in 1895, the 
literacy measure made its way through both the House and 
Senate in 1897, 1913, 1915, and 1917. Vetoed by presidents 
Grover Cleveland, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, 
the test was enacted by Congress over Wilson's veto in 1917. 
The new law, however, as John Higham has pointed out, 
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"proved a fairly coarse sieve," since rising literacy rates 
in Europe blunted the law's iropact. 37 
Dunn presented a point-by-point defense of the 
restrictive voting eligibility requirements contained in his 
document during a speech before the American Political 
Science Association's 1911 annual meeting. An education test 
for suffrage was essential, he argued, because if 
illiterates were permitted to vote, someone would have to 
mark the ballot for them, which eliminated the secret ballot 
and could make vote buying easier. Also, a poll tax was 
needed because, according to Dunn, a "large part of the 
class who sells their votes are included in the class who do 
not pay their poll taxes. 1138 
As to the tightening of residential standards, Dunn 
pointed out that the 1851 Constitution gave immigrants with 
six months residence in the state, and who had declared 
their intention to become United States citizens, the right 
to vote because the state wanted to encourage immigrants to 
settle within its borders. 39 In recent years, however, Dunn 
claimed that there appeared in Indiana "a large class of 
immigrants who have no real intent to become citizens, but 
only to accumulate enough money for comfortable living in 
their native countries." Since these people were interested 
only in making money, Dunn said, they were often more than 
happy to sell their franchise for cash. "In fact," he added, 
"they are commonly 'Naturalized' in blocks, by political 
parties that have already bargained for their votes. 1140 
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The dishonest elections resulting from this rampant 
bribery and vote selling were "sapping the very life of the 
nation today," Dunn told the association members. Such 
Progressive attempts to remedy the ills of government as the 
initiative, referendum, and recall; commission government; 
and the short ballot were "only salves applied to the skin 
to cure a blood disease." He believed that the only way to 
obtain good government was to ensure honest elections. Dunn 
asked those assembled: 
What do direct primaries amount to, if the voters are 
bought? What are the initiative, referendum, or recall if 
the appeal is to a debauched electorate? What is commission 
government, if the commissioners can buy their elections? 
What difference whether a man votes a long or short ballot, 
if his vote is sold? Of what avail to try to control the 
"big business" of the country, so long as we allow it, by 
the supply of campaign funds, to buy the election of men who 
will serve it? The first and greatest requisite--the one 
without which all others a~punt to nothing--is the 
purification of elections. 
Marshall echoed Dunn's fears about "aliens" somehow 
besmirching the sanctity of the ballot box. Discussing the 
new Constitution with a fellow Democrat, Marshall said that 
after consulting others, he believed that it was "advisable 
to see if we could not try to limit the suffrage in Indiana 
by a new Constitution. 1142 During a June 1911 speech before 
the Indiana Democratic Editorial Association in LaPorte, 
Indiana, Marshall reminded his audience that voting "was not 
an inalienable right." The governor termed unrestricted 
suffrage as "one of the [most] dangerous experiments in 
government." The governor stated that a great number of 
foreigners had come into the state and, aided by unnamed 
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"political manipulators," had polluted the purity of the 
b 11 t b d th t d t . . '1' t' 43 a o ox an rea ene o menace Amer1can c1v1 1za 1on. 
Perhaps secretly agreeing with Dunn's assessment that 
"honest" elections could mean trouble for the GOP at the 
polls, the Republican response to the new Constitution was 
overwhelmingly hostile. GOP leaders in both the Indiana 
House and Senate blasted the measure calling it a "one-man 
constitution" and claiming that Marshall was usurping the 
people's rights. Senator William Wood of Lafayette derided 
the fact that the legislation was agreed upon at a party 
caucus and not by the people, and he also argued that "there 
is not a single member of this Legislature that was selected 
for the purpose of framing a constitution." Representative 
Jesse Eschbach of Warsaw, House minority leader, called the , 
governor's action "contemptible" and claimed it marked "the 
last gasp of what promised to be a period of Democratic 
power and prestige, a puerile attempt to bolster up fallen 
political power and to conceal the failure and blundering of 
two years of Democratic supremacy." 44 
Senator James Sexson of Owen County went one step 
farther than his GOP colleagues. On 16 February 1911 Sexson 
introduced a Senate resolution appointing Marshall as a 
committee of one with the power to put the new Constitution 
into effect without holding an election. The resolution also 
gave the Democratic governor the power to "revise the Lord's 
prayer, amend the Declaration of Independence, repeal the 
Mosaic Law, bring the thirty nine articles of faith down to 
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date, abridge the sermon on the mount and do all other 
things as will appear in his infinite wisdom and supreme 
interest in the welfare of the people, to be fitting and 
proper." The Indianapolis Star reported to its readers that 
Democratic senators said nothing after the resolution had 
been called out of order, but "the Republicans were still 
smiling broadly when they adjourned." Although his proposal 
failed to pass muster, Sexson did get something for his 
efforts--pats on the back from amused GOP legislators. 45 
The GOP's assault on the new Constitution received 
daily coverage in the Indianapolis Star, which supported the 
Republican party editorially. The newspaper constantly 
hammered away at the plan and its architects, giving front-
page coverage to attacks on Marshall from former GOP 
governors Winfield Durbin and J. Frank Hanly, and gave the 
same prominent space to a group of lawyers who viewed the 
measure as unconstitutional. 46 The Star, however, saved its 
biggest broadsides against the plan for its editorial pages. 
Recalling Marshall's campaign speeches in which the 
candidate claimed to be a strict constructionist when it 
came to executive authority, the newspaper asked why in this 
instance Marshall turned his back on his stated beliefs. 
Although the Star suggested the possibility that the 
governor planned to use the issue of a new Constitution as a 
way to promote a run for the White House in 1912, it 
nevertheless concluded that Marshall was "a man urged on by 
imperious circumstances to do that against which his whole 
nature revolts. It must be hard for a sensitive man to do 
something that he feels instinctively is wrong." 47 
The Star hinted in its editorial pages that Dunn was 
the person to blame for pushing Marshall down the path of 
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constitutional ruin. Calling Dunn "advisor to the throne and 
oracular interpreter of all constitutions," the editorial 
also damned him for his "unerring inaccuracy" on 
constitutional matters. The newspaper went on to state that 
Democrats like Dunn and Marshall worshipped a "tin god" 
called "powers not delegated." Anyone using such powers, the 
editorial added, was "fit for nothing less terrible than 
b '1' '1 48 01 1ng 01 ." 
In spite of these partisan attacks and complaints from 
some special interest groups (women suffragists and 
prohibitionists) that their agendas were being ignored, Dunn 
stood firmly behind his proposal. He produced a number of 
articles defending the new Constitution for the Democratic-
leaning Indianapolis News, which, along with the 
Indianapolis Sun (a politically independent newspaper), 
supported the constitutional reform effort. Dunn's News 
articles outlining the case for the new Constitution were 
eventually combined into a pamphlet titled The Proposed 
Constitution of Indiana. In the articles he acknowledged the 
protests of those interests left out of the legislation, but 
he pointed out that their concerns could be addressed in the 
future, because the amendment process would be much easier 
under the new Constitution than the old one. He also said 
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that those people who liked the changes but opposed the way 
in which the new Constitution was submitted had a simple 
method for registering their complaint--at the ballot box. 
"If you really believe that 'it is a good meal, but it came 
through the wrong hopper,'" advised Dunn, "the sensible 
course is to take the meal and save your condemnation for 
49 the hopper." 
Along with Dunn, Marshall kept busy defending the 
effort to change the state's highest law. The Republican 
onslaught against the measure hardened the governor's 
support for Dunn's work. "A theory must fall in the face of 
a condition," Marshall responded to those who said he was 
turning his back on his stated beliefs in each branch of 
government keeping to its own business. Once someone 
discovers a theory they held was incorrect, the governor 
added, they should not "be condemned for forsaking a theory 
50 to meet a practical problem of government as it is now." 
In a letter to Democratic Congressman Henry Barnhart, 
Marshall noted the outcry over the issue but reasoned that 
"the way the Republicans are jumping on it (the new 
Constitution] convinces me that it must have some merit in 
it. 1151 In a later letter to the congressman, the governor 
outlined his other, more economically based, reasons for 
backing Dunn's work: 
While the lawyers amendment is pending, we can propose no 
additional amendments. To get rid of it would perhaps cost 
$100,000.00 in a special election. To call a constitutional 
convention might cost half a million dollars and nothing be 
accomplished. The proposed changes are so slight as to not 
shock anybody when they are considered, can be passed upon 
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by the people without a single cent of expense; if rejected, 
no harm is done, if approved, an easy way is opened up for 
all future changes in the constitution which the people may 
desire. If the method is illegal and improper, of course, 
the courts are open to stop the same. I am quite sure that 
all good c~fizens desire a more stringent regulation of the 
franchise. 
Along with the cost, Marshall feared that due to the 
widely divergent views in Indiana on such reform issues as 
prohibition, equal suffrage, and the initiative, referendum, 
and recall, any constitutional convention "would be fraught 
with great danger and would shake the state into a great 
passion." He also foresaw that a convention would be filled 
with partisan bickering, a prediction the governor said was 
substantiated by the GOP assaults on the new Constitution. 53 
James A. Woodburn, an Indiana University professor of 
history, disagreed with Marshall's view that a 
constitutional convention might become too partisan. 
Instead, Woodburn described the new Constitution as "too 
unusual and too partisan." He predicted that if the document 
made its way to Hoosiers for their decision at the polls, it 
would be defeated by as many as one hundred thousand votes. 
"Three parties," he wrote Grace Julian Clarke, active in the 
state's women's suffrage movement, "will oppose it in 
convention,--Republicans, Socialists and Prohibitionists. 1154 
Later, during a 5 May 1913 speech to the Woman's Franchise 
League of Indiana, Woodburn conceded that the Indiana 
Constitution's amendment process was "absurd," but 
recommended a different approach than Dunn's for improving 
the document. The IU professor advocated letting "the people 
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decide in the good old way--through men elected for the 
purpose, their accredited representative in convention 
assembled--what changes shall be proposed in their 
constitutional organic law." Although he acknowledged that 
such a convention might produce some disagreements, Woodburn 
noted that "out of it all will come the common judgment, and 
by that we can afford to abide. 1155 
Dunn, who often acted as the governor's mouthpiece in 
the matter of the new Constitution, gave other reasons for 
Marshall's support. As a lawyer himself, the governor, Dunn 
argued, had expressed concern that the existing five-member 
Indiana Supreme Court was too small to handle what had 
become a large caseload. Other issues Marshall supported 
that were blocked by what Dunn termed "an antiquated 
constitution" included the passage of a workmen's 
compensation law and an easier method for the state to 
56 
condemn property. 
As the Dunn constitution made its way briskly through 
the General Assembly, the courts seemed to be the only 
roadblock left. Introduced by Senator Evan Stotsenburg, 
Senate Bill. No. 407--despite Republican efforts in the 
Senate's Committee on Constitutional Revision to 
indefinitely postpone action on the matter--passed the 
Senate on 27 February 1911. A similar situation occurred in 
the House, where the bill survived further GOP attempts at 
postponement. Partisan feelings ran so high that during the 
third reading of the bill in the House Republican 
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Representative Elmer Oldaker of Wayne County announced that 
some of the Democrats "ought to be hanged." Incensed by 
Oldaker's statement, Democratic Representative Harry 
Strickland of Hancock County challenged his colleague to a 
fight in the House cloakroom. Fortunately, cooler heads 
prevailed and the two men were separated before any punches 
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were thrown. On 2 March 1911, the House approved the new 
Constitution. Two days later, Marshall signed the bill into 
law. 
Frustrated at being unable to stop the new Constitution 
at the legislative level, opponents turned to the judicial 
branch for relief. John Dye and Addison Harris, two 
Republican attorneys who Dunn claimed had attempted to block 
previous Democratic reform legislation, sought a Marion 
County Circuit court injunction preventing the State 
Election Board from placing the new Indiana Constitution 
question on the ballot in the 1912 election. 58 Judge Charles 
Remster, a Democrat, granted the injunction and the case 
ended up in the Indiana Supreme Court. 
This temporary judicial setback sparked Dunn to 
vigorously campaign on behalf of his measure. Restating his 
firm belief in the need for honest elections, Dunn said the 
movement to reform Indiana's Constitution was fated to 
succeed despite Judge Remster's decision and the upholding 
of that decision by the state's highest court--an action he 
anticipated because the Supreme Court had a Republican 
majority. Because the attempt at constitutional revision was 
what he called a "moral reform movement" (a familiar 
argument made by reformers during the Progressive era), 
neither court decisions nor any other obstacles could halt 
its eventual success "any more than the anti-slavery 
movement was stopped by the Dred Scott decision." 59 
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On 5 July 1912 Dunn's prediction of the high court's 
decision came to pass, but with a twist. By a slim one-vote 
majority the Indiana supreme Court upheld Judge Remster's 
decision. The court's decision crossed party lines, as two 
Republican judges were joined by a Democrat in the majority 
opinion. That Democrat, Chief Justice Charles Cox, in 
writing the majority opinion, said the case's main question 
was whether or not creating a new Constitution was "a valid 
exercise of legislative power by the General Assembly." 60 
Cox ruled that the "legislative authority" granted to 
the General Assembly by the Constitution did not include the 
power to replace or amend the document unless the 
legislature followed the process already outlined in the 
1851 Indiana Constitution. Although acknowledging the 
potential need for revising the document, Cox maintained 
that if the people of the state believed some changes were 
needed, they could make them by following the procedure 
already spelled out in the existing Constitution. "That they 
had not done so, and that the General Assembly may believe 
good will follow by deviating from the slow and orderly 
processes, will not justify a construction of the 
Constitution which does violence to its intent and express 
provisions," wrote Cox. 61 
Dissenting from the majority's viewpoint, Justice 
Douglas Morris believed that the court had overstepped its 
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authority by killing the new Constitution before it could be 
voted on by Hoosiers. The court, he wrote, had the power to 
decide whether or not a statute had been legally adopted, 
but it could not "restrain the enactment of an 
unconstitutional law." To issue an injunction in this case, 
he added, would prohibit the legislature and electors from 
exercising their "legislative duty." He used as an example a 
messenger from the General Assembly taking a bill that had 
already been passed by that body to the governor. "Would 
anyone imagine," Morris asked, "[that] the progress of the 
messenger could be arrested by an injunction? The inquiry 
answers itself." He saw no distinction between the situation 
he outlined and the court's action in stopping a vote on the 
t . t t. 62 new Cons 1 u 1on. 
This dissenting view was echoed by Marshall, who took a 
page from his opponents on the issue by calling the court's 
action "a clear usurpation of authority." In his 
autobiography, the governor said that he had never intended 
that, if the new Constitution were ratified by Hoosier 
voters, the question of the measure's constitutionality 
could not be raised by anyone who felt himself injured by 
its passage. He called the court's majority opinion "the 
most flagrant interference on the part of the judicial with 
89 
the rights, privileges and duties of the legislative and 
. 63 
execut1ve branches of government." 
Urged by many friends and advisors to ignore the 
court's decision and place the Constitution question on the 
ballot, Marshall instead decided to obey the majority's 
opinion. In reflecting on the controversy he said: 
I did not feel that I could afford to show any disrespect to 
the majority of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana, 
or to lessen the respect in which I was teaching the people 
to ~old t~e.cour~ds opinions, by myself openly flaunting one 
of 1ts op1n1ons. 
Instead of openly defying the court's decision, 
Marshall turned to the United States Supreme Court for 
relief. His appeal alleged that the Indiana Supreme Court's 
ruling on the new Constitution denied the people of the 
nineteenth state a "republican form of government." Before 
the U.S. Supreme Court could hear his case, however, 
Marshall left the governor's office for another elected 
position--that of vice president under Woodrow Wilson. Due 
to what Marshall termed a "technicality" (the appeal failed 
to substitute his successor's name for his own), his appeal 
was denied on 1 December 1913. Later meeting one of the 
justices of the U.S. Supreme Court at a Washington dinner 
party, Marshall asked him why the court had dismissed the 
case. The vice president quoted the justice as admitting 
that Marshall was right and the Indiana Supreme Court wrong 
on the Constitution issue. But the justice went on to say 
that it was the policy of the court "not to interfere, if it 
can avoid doing so, in any political question arising in any 
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of the states of the Union. 1165 That action greatly pleased a 
leading opponent of the new Constitution, the Indianapolis 
Star, which praised the court's action and hoped that the 
ruling would discourage "dark lantern methods in the 
. . f . . 66 rev1s1on o const1tut1ons." 
Blocked by the judicial branch of government in his 
plan for a new Constitution, Dunn, like Marshall, vented his 
wrath at the Indiana Supreme Court's decision. Ever the 
reformer, and someone who hated to lose on any issue, he 
lamented the lack of any checks or balances on judicial 
power. Dunn said that until the American people rid 
themselves "of the absurd delusion that all judges are 
upright, and incorruptible, and infallible, and above 
partisan control, they will simply continue to suffer any 
indignities that the courts may choose to inflict upon 
th "67 em. 
The defeat of Dunn's new Constitution, to which 
Marshall had so closely allied himself, actually helped the 
governor's subsequent political career. The furor over the 
Marshall administration's campaign for constitutional reform 
was "very instrumental," in Dunn's mind, in securing for 
Marshall the vice presidential nomination at the Democratic 
party's national convention in Baltimore. The often 
rancorous debate on the issue succeeded in advertising 
Marshall's name "from one end of the nation to the other." 
He further theorized that the governor's support for such a 
progressive measure helped to alter perennial Democratic 
presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan's view of 
Marshall as a "reactionary.n 68 
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Dunn eventually left Indiana for service in Washington 
as private secretary to United States Senator Samuel 
Ralston. Reform of the state's Constitution, however, 
continued to attract the historian's interest. In 1921 at a 
meeting of the Indiana Democratic Club of Indianapolis, Dunn 
blasted three of thirteen amendments offered to the 
Constitution by the Republican party (especially an 
amendment allowing blacks to serve in the state militia) and 
mourned the defeat of his earlier legislation. If the 1911 
Constitution had not been halted by what Dunn called 
"unwarrantable court interference," the state could ignore 
the ten "unobjectionable" amendments and could have been 
"spared the humiliation during the late war of having alien 
enemies entitled to vote under its constitution. We are in a 
position to say: 'I told you so;' and Democrats ought to 
feel free to say it." 69 
The Republican amendment allowing African Americans to 
serve in the Indiana militia brought out the worst in Dunn. 
If a black militia company was sent to quell a labor 
dispute, Dunn warned, a race riot would break out and the 
"streets of Indianapolis will run blood on account of it." 
He also noted that although Indianapolis contained "a large 
population of orderly and well-disposed negro citizens," the 
city for years had also been a "haven for the criminal 
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classes expelled from other places, and especially from the 
South." 70 
The Indiana historian's racial bias (when it came to 
voting rights) had been displayed years earlier in another 
Indiana Democratic Club speech. During that talk Dunn 
ridiculed a GOP party platform plank calling for a reduction 
in both congressional and electoral college representation 
for states that unconstitutionally limited voting rights. 
"Suffrage," Dunn claimed, "had debased the negro, on the 
average, instead of elevating him. It has given him a false 
idea of citizenship. It has made him insolent and 
quarrelsome instead of self-respecting." Because he believed 
that the right to vote was based on the state's welfare, it 
would be unkind to give blacks "a right that is injuring him 
and injuring the state also." It was no injustice, he 
continued, to deny suffrage "to the negro who remains 
illiterate, shiftless or criminal. 1171 
Notwithstanding Dunn's fulminations against the 
Republican-backed constitutional amendments, one of them was 
similar to an amendment he had backed eleven years earlier. 
Amendment One, which was the only one of the thirteen 
amendments to receive more yes than no votes in the 1921 
special election (130,242 for the measure versus 80,574 
against), limited suffrage in Indiana to United States 
citizens, either native born or fully naturalized. On 10 
March 1921 Governor Warren T. McCray declared the amendment 
adopted. 72 The suffrage amendment survived a court challenge 
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questioning whether it had been approved by "a majority of 
electors in the state." The Indiana Supreme Court ruled in 
the case Simmons v. Bird that a majority of electors meant a 
"majority of the electors who vote at the election at which 
an amendment is submitted for ratification." The amendment, 
the court said, had been "properly adopted, regardless of 
the fact that there may have been a much greater number of 
qualified electors in the state than the number of those who 
actually voted at the special election." 73 
It took another fourteen years, however, for the 
Indiana Supreme Court to further ease its strict 
interpretation of whether an amendment to the state 
Constitution had been passed by the voters. In the case In 
re Todd, the court ruled that a proposed amendment became a 
part of the Constitution if it received "a majority of those 
votes cast for and against its adoption"--a much easier 
standard to meet than the one established by the In re Denny 
d . . 74 eClSlOn. 
The Indiana Constitution as it existed in 1911 was 
outdated, and Dunn's document contained measures that are 
considered commonplace in the last decade of the twentieth 
century. Still, constitutional scholars have recommended 
against allowing legislatures to make wholesale changes to 
their constitutions; they have preferred the more standard 
approach of having lawmakers offer a few amendments or call 
for a special constitutional convention to make the needed 
revisions. 75 Constitutional theorists have argued that a 
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legislative body has neither the time nor expertise 
necessary to craft a new Constitution for a state. Also, 
they cite the possibility that lawmakers' actions might be 
"colored by political considerations." The political party 
in power could ''exert undue political influence in rewriting 
the fundamental law." A specially called constitutional 
convention would be less likely influenced by outside 
pressures in its deliberations and more likely to be 
independent in its judgment than legislators who are "active 
participants in the political arena." 76 
Dunn's admitted attempts to limit suffrage through the 
new Constitution in order to gain a partisan advantage come 
election time were antidemocratic, especially his attempt to 
limit alleged foreign and minority influence at the polls 
through a poll tax and literacy requirements. The Indiana 
Supreme Court did, however, overstep its authority when it 
ruled Dunn's document unconstitutional even before it could 
be considered by Hoosier voters. 
Whatever the problems with his means, Dunn, not 
Marshall, should receive credit for conjuring up a unique 
method for attempting to change what has been called a 
"'stage coach' era Constitution." Before more liberal 
methods for constitutional changes were adopted, revisions 
in the state's highest law had proceeded at a glacial pace 
for many years. From the 1850s to the 1930s, the Indiana 
General Assembly considered approximately four hundred 
changes to the constitution. Of that number, twenty-five 
were considered by voters at the polls and only nine were 
approved, seven of which passed at an 1881 special 
1 t . 77 e ec 1on. 
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The national movement to tighten suffrage requirements, 
which Dunn championed in Indiana with his new Constitution, 
did have an effect on voting patterns. The introduction of 
the Australian ballot system, tighter registration and 
literacy requirements, combined with the weakening hold of 
political parties on voters, worked together to lower voter 
turnout from 79 percent of eligible voters in the 1896 
presidential election to 49 percent in 1924. Even in 
Indiana, where party competition remained fairly even until 
the 1920s, voter turnout declined from 95 percent of those 
eligible in 1896 to 78 percent by the 1912 election. 78 
Whether these lower turnouts consisted of the intelligent 
electorate Dunn desired is difficult to discern, but if they 
did he would have been disappointed with the results. From 
1917 to 1933, Hoosier voters elected Republicans as 
governor. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defeated by the courts in his attempt to transform 
Indiana's Constitution, Dunn nevertheless continued to 
immerse himself in Democratic party affairs and historical 
research. In 1913 he and fellow Hoosier Democrat Major G. V. 
Menziews of Mount Vernon were under consideration by 
President Woodrow Wilson to be named as the United States 
Minister to Portugal, a job that had been turned down by 
Indiana writer and diplomat Meredith Nicholson. Washington 
correspondent and Hoosier native Louis Ludlow reported that 
as a scholar and a literary man, Dunn was more than capable 
of filling the post "in accordance with the highest ideals 
of the diplomatic service." Also, and perhaps more 
importantly to the Democratic party, the historian's 
politics had always been of the "'regular brand.'" Another 
point in Dunn's favor was his earlier support of the free 
coinage of silver, which was looked upon favorably by 
Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, perennial 
Democratic presidential nominee and a staunch silverite. As 
Ludlow correctly predicted, however, Indiana lost out on the 
Portugal post when Nicholson decided against taking the 
't' 1 pOSl lOn. 
Instead of a diplomatic berth in Europe, Dunn turned 
his attention toward an adventure that would test his 
historical detective skills. In December 1921, well into his 
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sixties, he journeyed to Haiti with the announced intention 
of attempting to find the lost gold mine of Christopher 
Columbus. Actually, Dunn, with financial assistance from a 
group of twenty Indianapolis businessmen and attorneys, and 
one of his wife's relatives, president of the Haitian-
American Sugar Company, went to Haiti to prospect for 
another rich ore--manganese. During his several months in 
the Caribbean nation Dunn discovered traces of the valuable 
metal, but not in sufficient quantities to risk large-scale 
mining operations. He returned to his Indianapolis horne in 
February 1922. The trip may have failed to provide Dunn with 
riches from precious metals, but it did offer the historian 
the opportunity to investigate and write about Haitian 
dialects and the American presence in that country. 2 
Politics beckoned a year after Dunn's return from his 
Haitian experience. Newly elected United States Senator 
Samuel Ralston, former Indiana governor and a man who 
counted Dunn as a close friend, selected the historian to be 
his private secretary for his Washington office. Dunn's time 
in the nation's capital would be short. During his travels 
in Haiti he had contracted some form of tropical disease 
that left him susceptible to jaundice. His ill health forced 
his return to Indianapolis where he died on 6 June 1924. 
Commenting on his fellow Democrat's death, Ralston expressed 
his "great admiration" for Dunn. "He was not only loyal to 
the truth at whatever cost," said Ralston, "but he was loyal 
to a friend. And trustworthy--absolutely so. I shall miss 
him." 3 
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There are some scholars who regret that Dunn had not 
been born into a family of great wealth and prominence so he 
could have become Indiana's version of nationally prominent 
historian-politicians like Henry Adams and Henry Cabot 
Lodge, or pursued a doctorate in history so that his 
researches into the past might have received the support and 
encouragement of a university setting. 4 Dunn's work on local 
and state history, however, has weathered the years far 
better than many others, especially his book Greater 
Indianapolis, which has served as the standard work on the 
Hoosier capital's history for more than eighty years and is 
still consulted today by students and scholars interested in 
the city's early development. As an often active participant 
in Indianapolis's civic affairs through his career in 
journalism and politics, Dunn, more than a historian merely 
consulting paper documents recording the past, had the 
ability to impart to his readers the "inside story" of some 
of the events that helped to shape the community. Admittedly 
partisan in his support of the Democratic party, Dunn still 
proved to be scrupulous in presenting both sides of an 
issue. He may have questioned the correctness of a 
particular opposition politician's position on an point 
under debate, but Dunn recorded for posterity's sake all the 
details of that person's argument. Following his repudiation 
at the polls by English voters in 1945, Prime Minister 
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Winston Churchill commented that for his part, he considered 
it "will be found much better by all parties to leave the 
past to history, especially as I propose to write that 
history myself." 5 Dunn, too, possessed this ability. No 
matter if he or his party were beaten on a particular issue, 
Dunn took some satisfaction in knowing that he could always 
have the last word on an issue through his writings. 
Along with amateurs like John Brown Dillon and George 
s. Cottman, Dunn stands as one of the leading figures in 
Indiana historiography. Dunn also deserves, however, a 
foremost spot in the Hoosier state's political history for 
his efforts on behalf of numerous reform measures during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially 
his crusades to purify the ballot in Indiana. This blending 
of history and politics seemed a natural affair to Dunn who 
believed that a state "can not possibly profit fully by its 
experience unless it provides for handing it down from one 
generation to another by the preservation of its history." 6 
Through his personal involvement in issues and his writing 
about them, Dunn made certain that no Hoosier would soon 
forget the lessons of his time. 
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION 
1
"Two Indianians Suggested for Portugal Post," Indianapolis 
Star, 25 June 1913. 
2 See "Indianapolis Man, Backed by Local Bankers, Seeks Lost 
Mine of Columbus," Indianapolis Star, 27 January 1922; and 
Ruegamer, "History, Politics, and the Active Life," 281. 
311 Jacob Dunn Funeral to be Held Monday," Indianapolis News, 
7 June 1924. 
4 Ruegamer, "History, Politics, and the Active Life," 282. 
5 William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer 
Churchill, Visions of Glory, 1874-1932 (New York: Dell 
Publishing, 1983), 25-26. 
6 Dunn, "Duty of the State to Its History," 143. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 
Listed below are the works that were of the greatest 
help in preparing this work. By no means a complete record, 
this essay does substantially cover those primary and 
secondary sources that would be most useful to those wishing 
to explore the life of Jacob Piatt Dunn, Jr. and Indiana 
politics during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 
JACOB PIATT DUNN, JR. 
In examining the life and times of Jacob Piatt Dunn, 
Jr., the greatest resource available has been the work of 
Dunn himself. Never shy about expounding on his role in the 
political maneuverings of his time, Dunn deals with the 
reform efforts he championed in both Greater Indianapolis: 
The History, the Industries, the Institutions, and the 
People of a City of Homes, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1910) and 
Indiana and Indianans: A History of Aboriginal and 
Territorial Indiana and the Century of Statehood, 5 vols. 
(Chicago and New York, 1919). The Hoosier historian's papers 
located in the Indiana State Library and the Indiana 
Historical Society also provide valuable insights into Dunn 
the reformer. 
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Dunn, a prolific writer, offered glimpses into his 
beliefs through a variety of works for numerous 
publications. Those that proved to be most helpful for this 
paper included "Duty of the State to Its History," Indiana 
Magazine of History 6 (December 1910): 137-43; "Shall Indian 
Languages Be Preserved?" Journal of the Illinois State 
Historical Society 10 (April 1917): 87-96; The New Tax Law 
of Indiana and the Science of Taxation (Indianapolis, 1892); 
The Omitted Paper: Municipal Financial Pressure, An Address 
before the Second Annual Conference on Taxation in Indiana 
by J. P. Dunn, City Controller of Indianapolis 
(Indianapolis, 1914); The Real Trouble with the Indiana Tax 
Law: An Address by J. P. Dunn, City Controller of 
Indianapolis, at the Bloomington Tax Conference, February 5 
and 6, 1914 (n.p., 1914); Why is a Democrat? Speech of Han. 
Jacob P. Dunn on the Issues of the Present city Campaign, 
Before the Democratic Business Men's Meeting at the Denison 
Hotel, September 26., 1913 (Indianapolis, 1913); The Negro 
Issue: An Address by Jacob Piatt Dunn, city Controller of 
Indianapolis, before the Indiana Democratic Club, October 
13, 1904 (Indianapolis, 1904); The Unknown God and Other 
Orthodox Essays (Indianapolis, 1914); and "An Historical 
Detective Story," Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley 
Historical Association ... for the Year 1919-1920, X, Pt. 
II (1921) :230-58. 
There are only a few scholarly works on Dunn and his 
life, but those were extremely helpful for this effort. 
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Particularly valuable was Lana Ruegamer's "History, 
Politics, and the Active Life: Jacob Piatt Dunn, Progressive 
Historian," Indiana Magazine of History 81 (September 1985): 
265-83, and her examination of Dunn's relationship with the 
Indiana Historical Society in her book A History of the 
Indiana Historical Society, 1830-1980 (Indianapolis, 1980). 
Another work that provided background on Dunn's life was 
Caroline Dunn's Jacob Piatt Dunn: His Miami Language Studies 
and Indian Manuscript Collection (Indianapolis, 1937). 
Contemporaries of Dunn offered their assessments of the 
Democratic reformer and historian, and the experience of 
working for partisan newspapers like the Indianapolis 
Sentinel, in such works as Claude Bowers's My Life: The 
Memoirs of Claude Bowers (New York, 1962); Karl Detzer, 
Myself When Young (New York, 1968); and Louis Ludlow, From 
Cornfield to Press Gallery: Adventures and Reminiscences of 
a Veteran Washington Correspondent (Washington, D.C., 1924). 
For Dunn's place in the Progressive era, and the 
reasons for his crusading spirit, Robert M. Crunden's 
Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievement in 
American Civilization, 1889-1920 (New York, 1982), 
especially the role of parents on the subsequent careers of 
progressives like Dunn, was invaluable to this paper. The 
following works also offered background on the Progressive 
era and reform in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries: Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan 
to F.D.R. (New York, 1955); Hofstadter, The Progressive 
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Historians: Turner, Beard, Farrington (New York, 1968); 
Keith W. Olson, Biography of a Progressive: Franklin K. 
Lane, 1864-1921 (Westport, Conn., 1979); Arthurs. Link and 
Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, 
Ill., 1983); Daniel T. Rogers, "In Search of Progressivism," 
Reviews in American History 10 (1982): 113-32; William J. 
Crotty, Political Reform and the American Experiment (New 
York, 1977); John D. Buenker, Urban Liberalism and 
Progressive Refornl (New York, 1973); and Russel B. Nye, 
Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its 
Origins and Development, 1870-1958 (East Lansing, Mich., 
1959) . 
INDIANA POLITICS AND THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT ISSUE 
The Hoosier state's prominence in national politics at 
the turn of the century drove many of Dunn's attempts at 
reform. The most comprehensive examination of this time 
period can be found in Clifton J. Phillips's Indiana in 
Transition: The Emergence of an Industrial Commonwealth, 
1880-1920 (Indianapolis, 1968). For a shorter synopsis of 
the nineteenth state's political past, see Ralph Gray's 
Indiana's Favorite Sons, 1840-1940 (Indianapolis, 1988). An 
excellent examination of this "golden age" in Indiana's 
history can be found in John Bartlow Martin's Indiana: An 
Interpretation (New York, 1947). Also useful for the actions 
of the Indiana legislature during this period is Justin 
Walsh's The Centennial History of the Indiana General 
Assembly, 1816-1978 (Indianapolis, 1987). 
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For this study, Richard John Del Vecchio's "Indiana 
Politics During the Progressive Era, 1912-1916" (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Notre Dame, 1973), was particularly 
helpful, especially his view of reform constituting an 
integral part of the Hoosier state for many years before the 
advent of Theodore Roosevelt and the muckrakers. 
Although now somewhat outdated, Eldon C. Evans's A 
History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States 
(Chicago, 1917) offered useful information on the structure 
of this electoral reform. For a more contemporary account, 
see L. E. Fredman's The Australian Ballot: The Story of an 
American Reform (East Lansing, Mich., 1968). Also useful for 
this study was Jerrold G. Rusk's ''The Effect of the 
Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908," 
American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970): 1220-
38. For Indiana's experience with the Australian ballot 
system, see Robert LaFollette's "The Adoption of the 
Australian Ballot in Indiana," Indiana Magazine of History 
24 (June 1928): 105-20. 
The voting methods used by the state before and after 
the Australian ballot are highlighted in two works, Anna 
Marie Sander's "A Review of the Election Laws in the State 
of Indiana from 1787 to 1890 11 (M.A. thesis, Butler 
University, 1933), and Charlotte Ethel Bruce's "A Review of 
Indiana Election Laws, 1889-1935" (M.A. thesis, Butler 
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University, 1935). For an entertaining look at electoral 
fraud in the state near the turn of the century, Simeon 
Coy's The Great Conspiracy: A Complete History of the Famous 
Tally-Sheet Cases (Indianapolis, 1889) ranks with Plunkitt 
of Tammany Hall as a manual for practical politics. On the 
other side of the coin, the case for reform is eloquently 
made in William P. Fishback's A Plea for Honest Elections: 
An Address Delivered to the Students of Indiana State 
University, May, 1886 (Indianapolis, 1886). The Democratic 
party's efforts at reform are covered exhaustively in David 
Sarasohn's The Party of Reform: Democrats in the Progressive 
Era (Jackson, Miss., 1989). 
THE INDIANAPOLIS CITY CHARTER 
Along with Dunn's inside view as offered in Chapter 27, 
"The City Charter," in Greater Indianapolis, a useful 
resource for the city's 1891 charter can be found in Charles 
Latham's William Fortune (1863-1942): A Hoosier Biography 
(Indianapolis, 1994), and the "Government" and "City 
Charters" entries in The Encyclopedia of Indianapolis 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994). 
For details on Indianapolis in the late nineteenth 
century, see Martin's Indiana: An Interpretation and Hester 
Anne Hale's Indianapolis: The First Century (Indianapolis, 
1987). A national perspective on the movement for municipal 
governmental reforms is provided by Samuel P. Hays's The 
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Response to Industrialism, 1885-1914 (Chicago and London, 
1957) and his article "The Politics of Reform in Municipal 
Government in the Progressive Era," Pacific Northwest 
Quarterly 55 (October 1964): 157-69. Also helpful for this 
study was Robert H. Wiebe's exploration of the new urban-
industrial order in The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New 
York, 1967). 
DUNN, GOVERNOR THOYillS MARSHALL, AND THE INDIANA CONSTITUTION 
The only biography of Thomas Marshall is Charles M. 
Thomas's Thomas Riley Marshall: Hoosier Statesman (Oxford, 
Ohio, 1939), which benefited from the support of Marshall's 
secretary, Mark Thistlewaite. Although entertaining reading, 
Marshall's memoir Recollections of Thomas R. Marshall, Vice 
President and Hoosier Philosopher: A Hoosier Salad 
(Indianapolis, 1925) offers a limited picture of the Hoosier 
politician's life. More thorough treatments of Marshall's 
political career are given in Keith s. Montgomery's "Thomas 
R. Marshall's Victory in the Election of 1908," Indiana 
Magazine of History 53 (June 1957): 147-66, and Rollo E. 
Mosher's "Tom Marshall's Term as Governor" (M.A. thesis, 
Indiana University, 1932). Marshall's papers in the Indiana 
State Archives and Indiana State Library also give more 
detailed accounts of his attitudes about the new Indiana 
Constitution fashioned by Dunn. 
114 
Dunn's role in the new Indiana Constitution is 
highlighted in Chapter 13, "An Era of Reform," in the second 
volume of his Indiana and Indianans. The Hoosier historian's 
arguments for the new Constitution and a detailed 
description of its differences with the 1851 Indiana 
Constitution can be found in Dunn's The Proposed 
Constitution of Indiana (Indianapolis, 1911). A spirited 
rebuke to Dunn's plan is offered by Christopher Coleman's 
article "The Development of State Constitutions," Indiana 
Magazine of History 7 (June 1911): 41-51. 
The best treatments of the national movement during the 
Progressive era to limit the suffrage rights of certain 
groups can be found in William J. Crotty's Political Reform 
and the American Experiment (New York, 1977) and Frances Fox 
Piven and Richard A. Cloward's Why Americans Don't Vote (New 
York, 1989). The latter gives an excellent review of the 
procedural methods used by reformers to limit voting rights. 
The suffrage restrictions aimed at immigrants are also 
explored in Roger Daniels's Coming to America: A History of 
Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life (New York, 1990), 
and John Higham's classic work Strangers in the Land: 
Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York, 1955). 
For a review of the attempt in Indiana to revise the 
1851 Constitution, the most extensive examination is in 
Charles Kettleborough's Constitution Making in Indiana: A 
Source Book of Constitutional Documents with Historical 
Introduction and Critical Notes, 2 vols. (Indianapolis, 
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1916). Those consulting this work should be warned that in 
several instances the documentary material was not 
transcribed accurately. This is particularly true in the 
Ellingham v. Dye decision. Later methods at revising the 
Indiana Constitution are examined in John A. Bremer's 
Constitution Making in Indiana: A Source Book of 
Constitutional Documents with Historical Introduction and 
Critical Notes (Indianapolis, 1978). The procedures utilized 
over the years to amend constitutions is covered in Robert 
Luce's Legislative Principles: The History and Theory of 
Lawmaking by Representative Government (Boston and New York, 
1930) and Albert Sturm's Methods of State Constitutional 
Reform (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1954). 
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